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TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION*
BY DAVID A. SUPER**
In law as in life, we make both cross-sectional comparisons between analogous
things at the same time and temporal comparisons involving the same thing at
different times. Equal protection analysis, however, has been entirely crosssectional. Applying equal protection temporally would address the all-toocommon situation where the dominant group benefits from laws and then pulls
up the ladder behind it before minorities can follow.
Courts have struggled when confronted with temporal denials of equal
protection. State and local governments terminated public services during the
“massive resistance” period. Similarly, after Obergefell, some jurisdictions
stopped issuing marriage licenses. Subtler problems have arisen as schools and
other public programs have steadily lost funding after being opened to people of
color and as states tighten voter identification rules when people of color vote in
larger numbers. Debates on the intent required for an equal protection claim
obscure questions about how to measure inequality.
Temporal equal protection would add to a wide range of constitutional and
quasi-constitutional doctrines that inhibit change. These stasis-reinforcing
doctrines provide valuable guidance on how temporal equal protection could
function. Because the remedy of blocking, rather than forcing, change is less
intrusive on the political branches, courts have applied searching scrutiny more
freely under exacting stasis-reinforcing doctrines than when forcing change
under cross-sectional equal protection. They have recognized economic-based
oppression, have not demanded overwhelming evidence of intent, and have
considered context more seriously.
Temporal equal protection alone will not remedy persistent inequality, but it can
address some problems that current doctrine cannot.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost everyone, from serious social scientists to ordinary people going
about their daily affairs, assesses the world through two distinct kinds of
comparison. We compare different things that exist at the same time for their
similarities and differences—cross-sectional analysis in the language of
statisticians. And we compare the same thing over time looking for consistency
and change—what statisticians call time-series analysis. Each analysis provides
important insights, springing in part from its distinctive baseline for the
comparison. It is unfair to criticize an airline for being late more often this
month than last because the weather may have been worse, but we may gain
insight from comparing one airline’s on-time performance to the industry
average. Similarly, comparing my soccer game to Lionel Messi’s is unfair
because I could never be that good, but you may gain insight from assessing
how much better or worse I am doing relative to the last time I played.
Strikingly, however, contemporary equal protection analysis is essentially
all cross-sectional. If, at any given time, a legal regime imposes different rules
on whites and on people of color without sufficient justification, the courts
deem that regime to have violated its duties of equal protection. If, however, a
legal regime changes its rules when, over time, the characteristics of the people
to whom those rules apply change, we rarely attempt serious equal protection
analysis. If the change does not infringe upon a limited set of protected
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expectations, and if it was procedurally acceptable, it gets a pass
constitutionally.
A simple example illustrates the point. Few would argue that any
constitutional principle prevents state parks from closing either at noon or at
8:00 p.m. Furthermore, nothing prohibits the delegation of authority to set the
closing time to the superintendent of the park. What if, however, the
superintendent changes the closing time frequently, adopting the 8:00 p.m.
closing when a large group is scheduled to arrive from a predominately white
community and the noon closing when a tour group from a largely African
American neighborhood is expected? Indeed, what if the superintendent
changed the park’s closing time for each new carload of prospective visitors,
elongating it when whites are approaching and shortening it when a family of
color drives up? What if the superintendent adopts longer hours for the days of
the week, or seasons, when visitors tend to be white and shorter hours during
the periods when more of the park’s visitors are people of color? At no point are
whites treated better than people of color wishing to use the park at the same
moment, yet the effect of these strategic shifts in policy over time is to give
whites far more access to the park than people of color. One could argue that
the superintendent is applying a covert policy of shortening hours for African
Americans and elongating them for whites, but current doctrine imposes
difficult standards of proof for such a claim, especially if the superintendent
only acts most of the time that the racial composition of park visitors shifts.
Temporal reductions also are troubling when they involve fundamental
rights. No obvious, transcendent principle tells us how often governors or state
legislators ought to be elected. But we instinctively rebel against the notion that
officials, having won an election, may extend their own terms, depriving their
opponents the same right to contest and win an election that they enjoyed.
Similarly, although arguments may be made for broad discovery and liberal
joinder or for limited discovery and restrictive joinder, it would be troubling if
my allies changed the procedures that applied when I sued you by the time you
took me to court.
Awareness of both kinds of discrimination permeate our culture. We
demand cross-sectional equality when we say “what’s good for the goose is good
for the gander,” but we also recognize the importance of temporal equality when
we say “what goes around, comes around.”
Many equal protection problems are actually intertemporal problems.
Senator Jacob Howard said that the proposed Equal Protection Clause would
prohibit a Black man from being executed for a crime for which a white man
would not be.1 This surely is true for simultaneous trials. But that disparity in
treatment would be no better if the law of capital punishment was changed
1. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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between the time of the two trials to spare the white man or to condemn the
African American. Similarly, challenges to the administration—rather than the
substance—of laws address situations when administrators act differently at
different times, sometimes harshly enforcing laws to the benefit of favored
groups but at other times ignoring them to the detriment of those they dislike.2
Given the Equal Protection Clause’s textual focus on administration of the
laws,3 the absence of formal shifts in the legal rules between disparate
applications of those rules should not be grounds for refusing to apply temporal
equal protection.
To date, however, the Supreme Court generally has sought to avoid
considering temporal equal protection claims. For a time after Brown v. Board
of Education,4 the Court seemed to embrace a theory of equal protection that
attacked racial aggression or subordination without regard to any comparisons,
cross-sectional or temporal. But when it decided cases based on comparisons, it
considered only cross-sectional ones. When confronted with obvious temporal
abuses during the “massive resistance” period, it either accepted policy changes
that denied African Americans what whites long had enjoyed5 or insisted on
reframing the problem as cross-sectional discrimination by finding some current
favorable treatment for whites that was not being afforded to African
Americans.6
The basic principle should be that for a governmental body to apply a more
favorable legal rule to members of a dominant group and a harsher rule to those
of a systematically disadvantaged minority is a denial of equal protection. It
should not matter whether those two groups exist at the same time or at
different times. Put another way, if we reject the principle of temporal equal
protection, we accept that the government may deny rights or services to people
of a disfavored racial or religious group solely because of their race or religion
so long as it is not simultaneously providing that right or service to members of
the dominant group. This seems a disturbingly narrow vision of equal
protection.
This Article contends that we are unlikely to achieve meaningful equality
without taking temporal equal protection seriously and that doing so would not
seriously burden representative democracy. Although the values it upholds are
2. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (describing the unequal application
of an ordinance against people of Chinese ancestry).
3. See M ICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS ? 120
(1994).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (allowing the city to close public
swimming pools rather than open them to African Americans).
6. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1964) (finding
discrimination in the closing of all public schools because the county was assisting all-white private
academies).
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similar to those of cross-sectional equal protection, its function would be similar
to the many change-inhibiting principles well-established in our constitutional
law.
Part I examines the limited influence temporal ideas have already had on
equal protection thinking. This includes modest substantive applications as well
as some impact on remedies.
Part II contends that the limitations we have been told are inevitable in
equal protection actually are specific to judicial review of line drawing rather
than inherent in the concept of equal protection itself. As such, when equal
protection is applied temporally, scrutinizing policy changes rather than
distinctions within policies, many of those problems attenuate or disappear
altogether. This part considers how an explicitly temporal equal protection
doctrine might operate, drawing guidance from other change-inhibiting
doctrines as well as from cross-sectional equal protection. In particular, it
contends that the combined effect of temporal equal protection’s narrower
scope—only changes in law—and its far less intrusive remedies—preserving a
status quo crafted by democratic institutions—ameliorates the institutional
concerns the Court has invoked to cabin cross-sectional equal protection. This
makes viable a more pragmatic, though still highly deferential, mode of
scrutiny.
Part III demonstrates that although equal protection law has neglected
temporal analysis, many other areas of constitutional law have imposed
analogous change-inhibiting doctrines. In important respects, the challenges of
inhibiting change differ from those of forcing it, making these aspects of
constitutional law valuable in understanding temporal equal protection’s
potential. Several important principles uniting other change-inhibiting
doctrines offer valuable insight into how temporal equal protection might
operate. This survey shows us that we already have numerous rules and
institutional arrangements that entrench the status quo against majoritarian
change. Applying equal protection principles temporally would not break new
ground in anti-majoritarianism but rather would add equal opportunity to the
list of concerns that we sometimes elevate above majoritarian democracy in our
republic.
The conclusion offers a few necessarily superficial sketches of claims that
might be brought under temporal equal protection. Some of these are problems
that have vexed cross-sectional equal protection; others are social problems that
previously have been thought outside the ambit of equal protection analysis.
Not all of these claims would likely prevail, but in each instance the temporal
perspective helps identify the essential issues.
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I. TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION TO DATE
At present, the Court recognizes only a cross-sectional form of equal
protection. This dominance is somewhat odd because, in a loose sense, crosssectional equal protection reflects civil law sensibilities, which presume that the
benefit of a statute is extended to others similarly situated. Temporal equal
protection, by contrast, exemplifies the common law tradition that relies on
consistent application of rules across time.7
At one time, however, the Court took some tentative steps down a path
that could have led it to temporal equal protection. The Court’s subsequent
narrowing of the scope of equal protection eliminated that possibility. Some of
the Court’s struggles with crafting remedies for cross-sectional discrimination
highlight the advantages of a temporal approach. This part surveys the degree
to which temporal equal protection ideas already have penetrated constitutional
thinking.
A.

The Prevalence of Temporal Discrimination

Larry Alexander posits that many purported changes camouflage as
consistent, discriminatory meta-rules.8 And indeed fair housing, employment,
and other fields of antidiscrimination law occasionally look to such purported
temporal changes as evidence that covert cross-sectional discrimination is
underway: the apartment or job that was supposedly unavailable for an
applicant of color turns out to be open after all when white applicants arrive.
No doubt some purported temporal changes are indeed fraudulent attempts to
conceal cross-sectional discrimination.
Sometimes, however, the change is real and is applied consistently at a
given time. When southern governments closed public facilities they had been
ordered to integrate, those facilities often were truly closed.9 When some
jurisdictions tried to withdraw government licensure of marriages rather than
opening themselves to same-sex couples, they genuinely shut down licensing.10
These are not cases of cross-sectional discrimination.
Well-timed policy changes become highly attractive means of
disadvantaging protected classes. Only the naive would expect that bigots will
meekly abandon their agendas when prevented from engaging in cross-sectional
discrimination. Changing longstanding rules that are benefiting the groups the
bigots dislike—temporal discrimination—often will be an appealing alternative
means of achieving similar ends. More broadly, as government programs, and
7. See Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan’s
Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 272–74 (1972) (describing the civil law approach).
8. Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time, 6 LEGAL THEORY 391, 399–401 (2000).
9. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219.
10. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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the protection of laws, broadened over the past half-century to include more
African Americans and other people of color, women, and sexual-identity
minorities, this country has become increasingly resistant to funding many
kinds of programs and hostile to protective regulations.11 Some of this is no
doubt philosophical, but a malign bloc that supports spending and government
intervention for whites, for men, or for traditional families—but not for
interventions from which all people benefit—is decisive when big- and smallgovernment forces are near equipoise.12 Thus, in cities where many white
students left for suburban or private schools, white legislators and voters have
cut funding for public schools that now serve predominately students of color—
but all students in those schools suffer the same. Scholars on both the Left13 and
Right14 have argued that public welfare policy in this country became far more
restrictive after the “Civil Rights Revolution” opened programs up to African
Americans.15
A robust temporal equal protection doctrine would limit the government’s
ability to withdraw policies that have benefited members of a dominant group
when those policies are about to benefit members of a vulnerable group. If crosssectional equal protection seeks to “protect against substantive outrages by
requiring that those who would harm others must at the same time harm
themselves,”16 temporal equal protection guards against such outrages by forcing
would-be malefactors to harm themselves previous to harming others. Temporal
equal protection would limit the government’s ability to withdraw certain
beneficial policies when the population those policies serve changes to include
more members of unpopular groups.
B.

Temporal Equal Protection and Constitutional Theory

Temporal equal protection fits well in the broader framework of
constitutional theory. As Section I.B.1 shows, concern about change—both
forcing change in corrupt, oppressive regimes and guarding against the sudden
elimination of important rights—has long been at the core of much of the
11. See, e.g., Why So Many People Hate Obamacare, CNN (Jan. 6, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/
2017/01/05/news/economy/why-people-hate-obamacare/index.html [https://perma.cc/WAL5-ZTRP].
12. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
171, 171–72 (2000) (urging this sort of disaggregation of legislative intent).
13. See, e.g., DOROTHY K. NEWMAN ET AL., PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY: BLACK
AMERICANS AND WHITE INSTITUTIONS, 1940–75, at 264–65 (1978).
14. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: T HE NONWORKING
POOR IN AMERICA 33 (1992) (finding that African Americans’ enrollment in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children after racial barriers fell “damag[ed] antipoverty policy”).
15. See David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 2806, 2810–11, 2824,
2827, 2830 (2014) (comparing the difficulty people of lower income and racial minorities have
organizing).
16. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170
(1980) (emphasis added).
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theoretical underpinning of constitutional law. Moreover, Section I.B.2 shows
that the central objection to vigorous equal protection scrutiny—the need to
respect majoritarian decisionmaking—takes on a different, and generally less
troubling, form in temporal analysis than it does in cross-sectional critiques.
Finally, Section I.B.3 shows that John Locke’s theory of the role private
property plays in a liberal democracy, a theory that deeply influenced the
Founders, by its own terms works only when opportunities remain open to all
over time.
1. The Central Role of Change in Equal Protection Theory
At least since Footnote 4,17 cross-sectional equal protection has been
described in terms of political market failure.18 Because some groups form
discrete and insular minorities against whom many voters will rally and with
whom few other voters will ally, the usual majoritarian process will not properly
reflect their views. That same political market failure causes increased support
for policy changes at times when they are likely to harm discrete and insular
minorities disproportionately.
Indeed, much of contemporary constitutional theory is at least implicitly
about change and hence implicates temporal equal protection. For example, part
of the justification for judicial enforcement of fundamental rights is to prevent
regimes that took power democratically from changing the rules so that they
may not be deposed in the same way. Similarly, much of what gives a
presidential administration its force is the President’s ability to impose legal
change much more rapidly than the other branches can respond. Where legal
change will increasingly face no effective institutional constraints, the danger
that incumbents act to privilege members of their coalition and deny similar
opportunities to those coming along later will inevitably rise. Yet on those rare
occasions where constitutional theorists consider the effect of temporal
inequality, they have seemed to assume without close analysis that the political
branches’ right to change rules is far more inviolable than their right to impose
classifications.19
2. Temporal Equal Protection and the Anti-Majoritarian Difficulty
More broadly, judges and scholars across the ideological spectrum have
argued for cabining judicial intervention out of respect for the democratic
17. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that the
end of the Lochner era did not preclude invocation of equal protection to protect fundamental rights of
discrete and insular minorities).
18. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 16, at 103 (arguing that judicial review is justified primarily to keep
the machinery of democracy functioning and to prevent majorities from oppressing permanent
minorities).
19. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 391–92.
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process.20 Yet even the strongest advocates of deliberative democracy concede
that truly democratic results are impossible as long as a large segment of the
electorate is impoverished and heavily dependent on the outcome of the
political process for the basic means of subsistence.21 These people will be
subject to strong influence by their more affluent compatriots in the process.
Those dependent on the political process for protection of their vital interests
experience the political process in a way altogether different from those whose
core interests have constitutional security: the former must proceed from the
perspective of self-interest while the latter may choose to pursue still-greater
personal advantage but also may choose to vote to achieve their ideological
preferences. Mitt Romney famously captured this dynamic when he
complained that nearly half of the population’s votes would be dominated by
their desire to retain government benefits and hence would not be available to
him even if they ideologically agreed with his message.22 Having some
protection against devastating withdrawals of subsistence benefits would free
these voters to select candidates on other criteria as well.
Professor Derrick Bell persuasively argued that African Americans obtain
the most positive public policies when their interests align well with those of
whites.23 Arranging circumstances so that whites and African Americans benefit
from the same policies at the same time, however, is exceedingly difficult.
Temporal equal protection expands the application of Professor Bell’s principle
to many more situations by protecting minorities if they can benefit from
policies that previously benefitted the dominant group. Indeed, temporal
analysis can provide real-world insights analogous to a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance24: members of the dominant group established a rule not considering
that it might benefit those to whom they are unsympathetic. Preventing
opportunistic reversal of that rule preserves their insight when they were free
of corrupting knowledge about whom the rule would serve.

20. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–42, 148–49 (1893).
21. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 142–43
(2004).
22. David Corn, Secret Video: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He Really Thinks of Obama
Voters, M OTHER JONES (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-videoromney-private-fundraiser/ [https://perma.cc/VF63-HB8P] (published in conjunction with the
original video). Governor Romney was, in fact, wrong on two counts: the fraction of the electorate
receiving government transfer payments fell far short of forty-seven percent, and, as the 2016 election
demonstrated, millions of people who do receive public benefits will occasionally vote for candidates
threatening to remove those benefits. This, however, is aberrational behavior, and his basic notion that
current conditions prevent elections from being full debates about what is best for the nation has
considerable force.
23. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–25 (1980).
24. See J OHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971).

98 N.C. L. REV. 59 (2019)

2019]

TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION

69

The key reason for limiting any equality-promoting doctrine is respect for
the political processes.25 Both cross-sectional and temporal equal protection
limit what legislatures and executive officials may do. The balance between the
principle of equality and that of democratic self-governance depends on the
degree to which upholding the former compromises the latter. Cross-sectional
and temporal equal protection impact the democratic process quite differently,
with those differences being an important factor in how much each doctrine
should be permitted to override executive and legislative decisions.
The crucial factor forcing curtailment on cross-sectional equal protection
is the need and right of the legislature to enact classifications.26 “There is hardly
a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others,”27
and legislatures cannot function if prevented from making both principled and
pragmatic judgments about whom should be covered by which rules.
By contrast, the interests justifying temporal discrimination can be framed
as essential to the right of the legislature to change its mind or of the electorate
to change its legislature. This concern is real: if we do not allow legislatures to
change their policies once adopted, we can no longer say that “elections have
results” and we may no longer operate “laboratories of democracy” to seek out
optimal solutions. The Lochner era taught us the perils of constitutionalizing
any one system of legal rules.28 On the other hand, because successful temporal
equal protection litigation, unlike many cross-sectional equal protection claims,
would leave in place policies that the people’s elected representatives designed,
it is far less of an affront to democracy and hence can reasonably be applied in
situations where courts would hesitate to honor an analogous cross-sectional
claim. Indeed, our constitutional law leans heavily in favor of change-inhibiting
doctrines, as temporal equal protection would be, rather than change-forcing
ones, as cross-sectional equal protection tends to be. In Federalist No. 62, James
Madison cautioned that “the mischievous effects of a mutable government” are
“innumerable” and argued for constitutional measures to guard against the

25. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245–48 (1976) (describing intrusions on the
political process likely to result if the Court were to extend cross-sectional equal protection to cases
where discriminatory animus could not be shown); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40–55 (1973) (describing how extending heightened constitutional scrutiny would undermine
state democratic processes).
26. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 221–28 (1962); ELY, supra note 16, at 30–31; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 60–61 (1999); see James B. Thayer, supra note 20, at 135–
42, 148–49 (explaining the origins of judicial deference to legislative decisions). But see PERRY, supra
note 3, at 149–55 (questioning the originalist legitimacy of extending equal protection scrutiny beyond
rules failing to recognize persons’ humanity).
27. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”. Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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hazards of policy changes, even those resulting from majorities of voters
selecting different representatives.29
3. Temporal Equal Protection and Property Theory
A legal regime in which people of color, or other disfavored groups,
consistently encounter more difficult barriers than did their forebears in the
dominant group is deeply problematic. It tends to discredit the notion of an
opportunity society—the American Dream that hard work and playing by the
rules get one ahead. It makes our strong preference for prospective-only
remedies to cross-sectional discrimination highly problematic: if the dominant
group need only sustain a preferential legal regime long enough to give its
members an advantage, those disadvantaged by the cross-sectional wrong will
continue to labor under an undeserved disadvantage absent reparations,
affirmative action, or other means. Employment discrimination affects workers’
abilities to compete for good homes in neighborhoods with good schools.30 With
education and home equity being the two most important means of intergenerational transmission of wealth, initial advantages bestowed on one
segment of society may spawn many decades of inequality if other groups do
not get a comparable moment in the sun.31
By contrast, if the act of granting a head start to its own members compels
the dominant group to afford similar opportunities to those coming after it, the
payoffs from discrimination will be far less. This principle of justice is
embedded in the Lockean concept of private property rights that undergirds
our legal order: mixing one’s labor with the land creates property rights only so
long as there is enough, and land as good, for those that come later.32
C.

Temporal Equal Protection in Existing Substantive Doctrine

The equal protection analysis the Lochner court conducted prior to 1937
was simply too different from the contemporary version to allow beneficial
comparisons. After entrenching the New Deal’s legitimacy, the Court began to
revive equal protection law under the new framework set out in Footnote 4 of
Carolene Products.33 Its initial cases were unclear as to whether they would
require a mechanical comparison at all or merely scrutinize laws harming
members of suspect classes. By rejecting the “separate but equal” approach on
legal rather than factual grounds, the Court extended equal protection to guard
29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 303–05 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
30. See Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in
Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 198–99 (2008).
31. See id.
32. See Carol M. Rose, ‘Enough, and as Good’ of What?, 81 NW. U. L. Rev. 417, 423 (1987)
(exploring what is required for property formation to be just under a Lockean framework).
33. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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against legislation hostile to discrete and insular minorities without requiring
formal comparisons. Loving v. Virginia34 similarly recognized that rules that
nominally affected people of all races equally could have a degrading effect on
people of color.35 Had this trend in the Court’s equal protection doctrine
continued, the need for temporal equal protection would have been far less.36
When the Court later moved to narrow its equal protection jurisprudence,
however, it more rigidly required cross-sectional comparisons. Indeed, crosssectional comparisons became so central to the Court’s doctrine that it began to
scrutinize the precision of proffered analogies.37 As Section I.C.1 shows, equal
protection doctrine did recognize the importance of temporal change. Whatever
promise those moves might have had, however, was lost in cases suggesting that
temporal claims must be reframed in cross-sectional terms or lose completely.
Section I.C.4 finds indications that state constitutional law may be more readily
adapted to consider temporal equal protection claims.
1. Partial Acceptance of Temporal Analysis in Equal Protection Doctrine
Temporal equal protection concepts have appeared in several areas of
constitutional doctrine, but the Court has fallen far short of explicitly
recognizing the principle. The Court has acknowledged the importance of
temporal equality by ruling that newly admitted states enjoy the same rights as
the original thirteen.38 Its doctrine disallowing facially neutral rules if enacted
with a discriminatory purpose39 places the emphasis on the act of legislating,
rather than the legislation itself, and thus has the effect of disallowing a
particular, albeit narrow, class of regressive changes.40
In upholding part of the Voting Rights Act against a cross-sectional equal
protection challenge to its failure to eradicate all comparable harms, the Court
made an explicitly temporal argument, granting Congress far greater latitude
for legislation that enhances access to fundamental rights, however imperfectly,

34. 38 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 11.
36. Throughout this period, the Court continued to analyze some cases involving fundamental
rights on the basis of cross-sectional comparisons, see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232–37 (1962)
(holding that congressional districts with large population disparities are unconstitutional), although it
addressed many fundamental rights claims without invoking equal protection, see, e.g., Boddie v.
Connecticut, 402 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971).
37. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1973) (noting that
low-income students do not always live in school districts with low tax bases); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (asserting that complete denial of aid to one child could be characterized as a partial
reduction to all children in a family).
38. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911).
39. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (finding discriminatory intent in
post-Reconstruction changes to the Alabama Constitution).
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relative to legislation that restricts rights.41 More recently, however, the Court
has backed away from that idea.42 The Court also has relied on temporal
comparisons to strike down attempts to repeal or override civil rights
protections, even ones that go beyond what it holds the Constitution to
require.43 In these situations, the end state—no civil rights protections beyond
those in federal law—is not constitutionally offensive,44 but the act of removing
heightened protections is.
Moreover, in two important respects, temporal analysis permeates
contemporary cross-sectional equal protection analysis. First, its requirement
that those disproportionately harmed prove discriminatory intent in
challenging a facially neutral rule focuses attention on the act of changing policy
rather than on comparisons of how that policy treats members of different
groups. If the act of enacting facially neutral policy was performed improperly,
it is invalid and may open the door to reinstating prior policy. Second, the state
action requirement focuses on specific interventions to change what is otherwise
occurring in society. When the state merely sits back and allows powerful
private entities to prey on others, the Court finds no state action.45 It is only
the affirmative act of exercising state power that implicates equal protection
doctrine.46 Here again, it is the act that is scrutinized, not the resulting state of
the world; the effect is making the status quo easier to maintain than to change.
2. Missed Opportunities to Embrace Temporal Equal Protection
When confronted directly with denials of temporal equal protection, to
date the Court has looked away. At times it has found ways to stretch the facts
to make out a fuzzy cross-sectional equal protection claim, but on other
occasions it has upheld withdrawals of public policies when a disfavored group
was set to benefit from them.
In Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County,47 a white-dominated
government closed its public schools rather than integrate them in compliance
with Brown v. Board of Education. The Court recognized that allowing the
county to close its public schools would devastate the desegregation enterprise
41. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
42. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (arguing that an interpretation of
Katzenbach expanding Congress’s power to interpret the Constitution is misguided).
43. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (overturning ballot initiative preventing
efforts against anti-LGBTQ discrimination); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967)
(overturning ballot initiative overriding California’s fair housing law).
44. Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–31; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374–75.
45. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (finding no state action in
the granting of a liquor license to a discriminatory social club).
46. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding the Equal
Protection Clause applicable to a restaurant operating in a state facility with which government was
working closely).
47. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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but struggled with how to characterize the violation. It acknowledged that crosssectional inequities between counties—all other Virginia counties maintained
public schools—did not merit heightened scrutiny under its doctrine.48 It
recognized that the problem was the closure of the public schools49 but could
not find a cross-sectional comparison that would allow it to invoke equal
protection. Ultimately, because both the state and the county provided
extensive aid to private, all-white schools operating in place of the closed public
schools, the Court essentially treated the closures as a scam violating its crosssectional equal protection decision in Brown.50 Accordingly, it ordered the
county to reopen its public schools on a desegregated basis.51 The Court might
have had a more difficult time had the case come before it during the first year
of the public schools’ closure, when the private replacement schools relied on
private funding.52 That would have forced it to address directly the termination
of public services because of a change—brought about by Brown—in who would
benefit from those services. Cross-sectional equal protection would not have an
obvious response to that action, but temporal equal protection clearly would.
This unwillingness to analyze discrimination temporally caused the Court
greater difficulties when confronted two years later with a Georgia park that a
municipality held under a trust document mandating racial discrimination.53
The city resigned as trustee, seeking to discontinue the park’s public status and
allow African Americans to continue to be excluded.54 At first, a bare majority
held that the city’s ongoing involvement in park maintenance continued to
implicate the city in racial exclusion.55 The Court acknowledged that years of
municipal involvement had given the park “momentum”56 but failed to examine
whether the city had sufficiently contributed to that momentum to make its
termination unlawful. Here, as in Griffin, it found racial animus and essentially
ruled on that basis alone, essentially admitting that it could not make out a
coherent cross-sectional comparison.57
A Georgia court responded by declaring that the trust had failed and that
the park land should revert to the residual heirs of the settlor, refusing to reform
the trust through cy pres to remove the racial condition.58 Although the Georgia
48. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31.
49. Id. at 231.
50. Id. at 232.
51. Id. at 233.
52. Id. at 223.
53. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966).
54. Id. at 298.
55. Id. at 301.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 301–02.
58. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1970) (deciding whether the Georgia Supreme Court
violated equal protection and due process when it failed to order integration of the park on remand
after Newton).
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court seemed to be disregarding both the terms of the will and basic Georgia
trusts and estates law,59 the more technical nature of these questions obscured
the racial animus.
Now, the sole question was the elimination of a park once its beneficiaries
were to include African Americans. The Court declared itself “disheartened”60
but could find no objection within cross-sectional equal protection law.61 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the act of closing a longstanding public park
and, invoking Griffin, argued that that act itself should be scrutinized.62
The following year, the Court had to confront the viability of temporal
comparisons in equal protection analysis. When ordered to desegregate five
municipal parks and swimming pools, Jackson, Mississippi, instead chose to
close them. The Fifth Circuit upheld this action by a single vote, and the
Supreme Court did the same.63 The Court began by noting the absence of any
persuasive cross-sectional comparison as people of all races currently lacked
access to the parks.64 It then found that the city’s claimed fiscal and public safety
reasons for closing the pools made racial animus less apparent and, in any event,
irrelevant where no valid cross-sectional comparison showed different rules
simultaneously being applied to people of different races.65 Choosing to read
Griffin narrowly as a cross-sectional comparison case—with the state covertly
providing education to white students but not African American ones—the
Court rejected any temporal reach for the Equal Protection Clause.66
Similar issues can arise whenever changes in demographics, economics, or
law broaden the scope of who might benefit from particular rules or public
programs. For example, when the Court held that excluding same-sex couples
from the right to marry was unconstitutional,67 some states sought to
discontinue issuing marriage licenses at all. From a cross-sectional perspective,
this was no different from the swimming pools closed in Palmer v. Thompson68:
once those policies were adopted, both gay and straight couples wishing to
obtain marriage licenses were treated the same. Indeed, the Alabama district
court that ordered state probate judges to stop distinguishing between sameand opposite-sex couples in issuing marriage licenses explicitly suggested that
issuing none at all might be an acceptable solution.69 In the litigation concerning
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 448–50 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 443 (majority opinion).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971).
Id. at 220.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 221–23.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
Strawser v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1329 n.3 (S.D. Ala. 2015).
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a Kentucky county clerk’s refusal to issue any marriage licenses, plaintiffs and
the amici focused entirely on the extent of the burden on the fundamental right
to marry rather than the inequity of withdrawing a public service that had been
available when only heterosexual couples could use it.70 Temporal analysis
would have made that litigation much simpler.
3. Temporal Equal Protection in Remedial Doctrine
In wrestling with remedies to cross-sectional equal protection violations,
the Court has illustrated the shortcomings of that doctrine and the ways in
which temporal equal protection can be more effective in promoting true
equality of opportunity. Thus, even in implementing its most important
initiative of the second half of the twentieth century, school desegregation,71 the
Court was extremely hesitant to intervene forcefully in crafting remedies to the
segregation it had found unlawful72 and hurried to extricate the federal courts
despite risks of recurrent violations.73
A central challenge in cross-sectional equal protection is determining what
remedies are feasible. Courts naturally proceed cautiously when pressing the
political branches to implement policies that may have unforeseeable side
effects. The Court has thus shown great deference to states wishing to “address
a problem ‘one step at a time,’ or even ‘select one phase of one field and apply
a remedy there, neglecting the others,’”74 without much attention to whether
the next “step” is ever taken. Because temporal equal protection seeks only to
preserve existing policies, it is largely free of this difficulty. To be sure, current
policy may have proven unsustainable or counterproductive since being
implemented,75 but it should be subject to specific proofs rather than the
necessarily speculative estimation of what new policies might do.

70. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 19–39, Miller v. Davis, 667 F. App’x 537 (6th Cir. 2016) (No.
15-5880); Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church and State in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance at 16–24, Miller, 667 F. App’x 537 (No. 15-5880); see also Miller v. Davis,
123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 935–37 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their substantive due process challenge to clerk’s policy), appeal dismissed as moot and cause
remanded, 667 F. App’x 537.
71. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
72. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1971) (reluctantly
authorizing more intrusive court-ordered remedies seventeen years after Brown).
73. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–91 (1992) (embracing dissolution of remedies
even while some violations remain); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
247 (1991) (approving dissolution of school desegregation decrees despite lingering concerns of
parents).
74. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
75. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320–21 (1977) (upholding more generous method
of calculating women’s earnings records for Social Security purposes based on experience that the prior
formula unduly favored men).
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Prohibitions generally are less intrusive remedies than mandates even if
some of the likely consequences may be similar.76 A meaningful mandate
generally requires sufficient detail to allow its purposes to be effectuated; a
prohibition could include such detail to guide future action in the same area,
but it also can merely reject the action that has been undertaken without
addressing whether similar actions would similarly be unlawful.
Existing stasis-reinforcing doctrines lead to remedies and predictable
secondary results quite different from those familiar from debates about changeforcing doctrines. The Takings Clause, for example, tends to promote tax
increases by prohibiting the government from forcing one or a few individuals
to pay for public works that benefit broader society.77 It also prohibits economic
redistribution of a particularly predatory type. In Stop the Beach Renourishment
v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,78 the plurality’s view that
common law doctrines are entrenched by the Takings Clause has the effect of
restricting what democratic majorities may do to change the law when it works
to the disadvantage of others.79 The key difference here is that those doctrines
tend to prevent majorities from disempowering those that already have wealth;
temporal equal protection tends to protect those that wish to acquire wealth in
the way other groups previously did.
4. Temporal Analysis in State Constitutional Law
Some state courts have gone a bit further in exploring temporal equal
protection. For example, some state constitutions prohibit “private and special
laws,” in effect creating a specialized form of equal protection for
municipalities.80 Exhibiting characteristic uneasiness about constitutional
limitations on line drawing, courts have typically adopted minimum rationality
analysis of de facto special legislation that avoids formal violations by creating
classes of municipalities that, not coincidentally, often contain only a single
municipality each.81 When, however, the legislature makes the ruse completely
obvious by adjusting the class boundaries when a second municipality seems
poised to enter, courts may intervene.82 In essence, courts are willing to allow
cross-sectional privileging of one locality but not to allow that locality to lock
in its preferred status over time.

76. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 493 (1990) (disallowing mandatory relief
to enforce civil rights where negative options had not been exhausted).
77. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (warning against exactions
leveraged with regulatory powers as a means of funding desirable public projects).
78. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
79. See id. at 715.
80. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23.
81. See, e.g., Secaucus v. Hudson Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J. 1993).
82. See id. at 297.
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II. CHALLENGES DESIGNING A TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE
Many problems familiar from cross-sectional equal protection analysis will
pose significant challenges to temporal equal protection. Some of these
problems change significantly in the shift from cross-sectional to temporal
analysis. And even when the problems are essentially the same in both contexts,
it should not be a foregone conclusion that temporal equal protection, with its
far less intrusive remedies and grounding in a broad tradition in constitutional
stasis reinforcement, should apply the same rules in resolving those problems.
This part explores some of the most prominent among these problems.
A.

Heightened Scrutiny

Because line drawing is fundamental to all legislation and regulation, a
cross-sectional equal protection doctrine that seriously scrutinized more than a
tiny fraction of state decisions would be utterly unmanageable. One of the great
struggles of cross-sectional equal protection has been to find a workable method
for limiting which among the “many classifications” found in statutes the courts
will scrutinize.83
By contrast, policy changes, although pervasive, are far less numerous than
line drawing. Moreover, the consequences of frustrating policy change are far
less anti-democratic than those of preventing line drawing: when a court
disallows a line drawn by the political branches, it produces a policy that no
elected officials selected, while a court rejecting a new policy typically maintains
one that elected officials previously designed.84 Thus, the need for means of
limiting the policies that temporal equal protection will scrutinize is not nearly
as pressing as was the corresponding quest in its cross-sectional counterpart. As
discussed below,85 many other change-inhibiting doctrines rely on scrutinyenhancing principles quite different from those in cross-sectional equal
protection. Instead, they identify a type of change that tends to be ill-considered
or oppressive and scrutinize all actions of that type. Some of these grounds
arguably are less important than vindicating the Constitution’s guarantees of
equality.
Still, denying the political branches the right to change policies is a
significant intrusion that should not be undertaken commonly or casually. The
83. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Statutes create many classifications which do
not deny equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”).
84. This is not universally true. If the prior policy was the common law, or the lack of any state
intervention because sufficient agreement on an intervention had previously proven impossible,
voiding a new policy from the political branches would reduce self-governance. With the republic more
than two centuries old, and the New Deal expansion of governmental regulation more than seven
decades on, genuinely new laws and regulations are relatively rare, although they do exist.
85. See infra Section III.B.
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prior electorate is not the same as the current one, and denying voters and their
representatives the opportunity to change policies does impair majoritarian
democracy. We should not multiply intrusions on the right to change without
clear justification for doing so. Indeed, excessively obstructing the means of
political change has been recognized as a justification for greater constitutional
scrutiny.86 Moreover, far too much policy change occurs for judicial scrutiny to
be feasible for more than a small fraction of the most important and potentially
problematic actions. Finally, without reasonably clear principles about which
actions are vulnerable to review, people may feel unable to rely upon newly
enacted rules.
The two most obvious starting points for focusing judicial scrutiny are the
criteria Footnote 4 established for elevated scrutiny in cross-sectional equal
protection and those that guide other change-inhibiting doctrines. Sections
II.A.1 and II.A.2 consider the former; Section II.A.3, drawing on the analysis
of Part III, seeks to distill possible focusing criteria from other changeinhibiting doctrines.
1. Suspect and Semi-Suspect Classes
The narrow definition of suspect classes for cross-sectional equal
protection is a function of its model of the proper functions of government and
how the political process might go awry. The basic model for cross-sectional
equal protection since the Lochner era’s collapse has assumed that government
is allocating consumption across the population. Because so many normative
claims could be made for different allocations, and because we prefer allocative
decisions to be made within the political process, courts generally defer to those
decisions.
Footnote 4 suggested more vigorous scrutiny of rules imposing different,
disadvantageous rules on discrete and insular minorities because their ostracism
prevents them from forming political coalitions with the ease that other groups
enjoy. Heightened scrutiny for policy changes that have negative impacts on
members of suspect or semi-suspect classes will accomplish little in temporal
equal protection if it comes with the requirement that policymakers explicitly
admit what they are doing. Because temporal discrimination is, by its very
nature, facially neutral, almost all claims likely will depend on showings of
disparate impacts. Several decades of cross-sectional equal protection and civil
rights enforcement, primarily under rules that effectively require showing
discriminatory intent, has trained bigots to cover their tracks. Efforts to remove
benefits from members of politically marginalized groups rarely have the kind
of fit the Court has required in cross-sectional cases. Withdrawals of previously
available rights and benefits typically occur after the composition of the
86. ELY, supra note 16, at 177–78.
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benefiting population has changed only partially: some residual members of the
dominant group will lose too.
On the other hand, the same political disabilities that prevent discrete and
insular minorities from resisting racial aggression in the form of established
rules also prevent them from having an effective voice when the dominant
group changes longstanding rules to prevent minorities from benefiting. Thus,
the rationale for heightened scrutiny in cross-sectional equal protection would
apply well to temporal discrimination.
The problems of proving intent and closeness of fit look significantly
different in temporal terms, where the potential volume and intrusiveness of
cases—and hence the importance of these screens for limiting judicial intrusion
on democratic processes—is reduced. Moreover, the focus is on one specific
point of decision rather than on classifications that evolved and persisted over
time. This may make importing concepts from general tort law easier in
temporal cases than in cross-sectional ones. For example, temporal equal
protection doctrine could require the party with the greatest access to the facts
pertinent to an issue to carry the burden of producing evidence on that issue.87
This seems especially timely in light of the Court’s new restrictions on
plaintiffs’ ability to prove problematic intent through discovery.88 Indeed, the
recent litigation concerning President Trump’s travel ban has shown that, even
where such evidence exists, courts may find that the public interest in open
political discourse counsels against using it.89 As discussed below,90 the Court’s
stasis-reinforcing doctrines often function in the opposite way, forcing
deliberation rather than dampening it.
2. Important Rights
Another set of exceptions to the minimum rationality principle in crosssectional equal protection allows courts to intervene to prevent the political
process from seizing up and locking one group into power for the long term.
Cross-sectional equal protection’s scrutiny of infringements on fundamental
rights has been focused on situations where no right need be provided at all but,
once provided, it may not be offered to one group and not another. Although
this has been theorized as preventing those in power from obstructing the

87. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944) (discussing the doctrine res ipsa
loquitur).
88. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009); see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868–69
(2017) (restricting a civil rights conspiracy statute to preserve the opportunity for candid conversation
between government officials).
89. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.) (considering
whether campaign statements by the candidate ultimately elected President are admissible to show
discriminatory intent), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
90. See infra Section III.B.1.d.
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channels of political change that could lead to their ouster,91 the Court has
applied it to rights with little direct connections to political or economic
change.92 Temporal equal protection can and should do much the same thing:
examine situations where a right, previously bestowed, has been withdrawn.
Consistent with the theorization of “fundamental rights” equal protection,
and with temporal equal protection’s purpose of preventing those achieving
success from denying similar opportunities to those coming behind them,
temporal equal protection should be particularly energetic in scrutinizing
withdrawals of rivalrous rights. Some rules and public programs confer absolute
benefits on those receiving them but do not directly diminish the positions of
others. When a public art museum buys new paintings, it brightens the days of
those that visit the museum, but it does not harm or undermine those that do
not. Nor will the museum’s closure obstruct opportunities for political or
economic change. By contrast, when the government facilitates the speech of
one group but not another, or makes it easier for one group to win public office,
it increases the chances that their opponents’ policy preferences will be rejected.
Temporal equal protection analysis is most crucial where a right is
rivalrous. If the state allows you to speak your mind but then shuts down the
forum before I can respond, you are likely to gain a lasting advantage over me.
If elections are conducted under rules that favor you and then those rules
disappear when conditions change so that they would favor me, I will have less
opportunity to reverse the policies you installed with your augmented
representation. Some benefits are indirectly rivalrous. Charles Reich showed
that having large numbers of people dependent on the government for
occupational licenses, transfer payments, and other “largesse” prevents them
from participating in politics on an equal footing with fellow citizens relying on
legally protected property rights.93 If one group receives the head start of a
superior education for a while and then further educational opportunities are
equalized, the former group will have a persistent advantage in competing for
jobs.
Benefits can be rivalrous cross-sectionally or temporally. When we apply
for admission to school, we are competing cross-sectionally. But ultimately, we
will be competing for jobs with people who went to school at different times
from us. Similarly, although voting is obviously rivalrous in a cross-sectional
sense—with one more vote for my side generally being equivalent to one less
vote for yours—voting is also rivalrous temporally, as a new majority can seek
91. ELY, supra note 16, at 177.
92. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (protecting equality in the ability to
marry).
93. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785–87 (1964); see also David A.
Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1826 (2013) (finding similar problems half a
century later) [hereinafter Super, New New Property].
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to override the decisions of an old one. An electoral system that produces clear
majorities in one period and then shifts to producing muddled ones in the next
will favor the dominant group in the first period even if the right to vote saw
no cross-sectional discrimination in either period.
Conversely, changes in rules concerning non-rivalrous benefits are more
likely to have legitimate rationales—such as changing tastes—and, because they
typically do less harm to disfavored groups, may be less likely to have malicious
motives.94 This is particularly true where the non-rivalrous benefit is, in some
sense, a luxury. Our society has grown sufficiently affluent such that a
substantial share of government policies convey benefits that are real but not
truly vital.95 Changes in these policies typically do less harm and hence have a
less compelling case for judicial scrutiny. Again, a municipality that stops
purchasing new art for its museum could legitimately have decided that the
public would benefit more if it shifted those funds to parks and recreational
programs.96
Some rights can be non-rivalrous under some circumstances but rivalrous
under others. John Locke’s famous formulation of property rights only claims
to apply so long as access to property is non-rivalrous97: once there is no longer
enough, and as good, for others, the principle that mixing labor with land should
yield property rights becomes much harder to defend. It will produce an elite,
wealthy class while property-owning opportunities exist but then insulate its
members from competition once it becomes more difficult to obtain land.98
Another distinction crucial to temporal equal protection is between
changes whose primary impact is transitory and those affecting long-term
interests. Stasis-reinforcing doctrines generally address major threats to
individuals’ capital;99 they are relatively lenient about impairments of the

94. Of course, where other bases for enhanced scrutiny exist, temporal equal protection could call
into question the termination of non-rivalrous rights. A public art museum that closes when forced to
open its doors to all races will have used public funds to serve only whites.
95. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: NON -DEFENSE
DISCRETIONARY
PROGRAMS
3
(2019)
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/PolicyBasics-NDD.pdf [https://perma.cc/J45H-NTZ2] (finding that only thirteen percent
of federal non-defense discretionary spending goes to programs targeting low-income populations).
96. Of course, if this shift occurred after the museum came under pressure to diversify its
collection with works from African, African American, or Hispanic artists, it would be far more suspect.
97. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
98. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT , THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 2–3 (1999)
(arguing that liberal democracy depends on keeping open opportunities to acquire substantial capital);
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 (2014) (finding increasing
concentrations of wealth over time absent strong public policies seeking to preserve opportunity).
99. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). But see First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (finding a taking in a temporary but complete
deprivation of property rights).
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current return capital produces.100 Separation of powers and federalism, too,
impose tighter constraints on major policy changes—typically embodied in
statutes—and impingements on state common law rights101 than they do on
more transitory policy changes implemented through regulations or other
executive actions. And where those agencies can act, procedural due process
constrains them more heavily where weightier interests are at stake.102 Courts
can block withdrawals of education that “strike at the heart of equal protection
values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions”103
without immersing themselves in the details of how most public services are
provided. This distinction seems far more important for preserving temporal
equity than that between recognized “fundamental rights” and everything else.
Discontinuing elections for drain commissioner or reducing the venues
available for commercial speech does nothing to stratify society, unlike gutting
the public schools or abruptly discontinuing a subsistence benefit program to
leave former recipients desperate and dependent.104
Finally, temporal equal protection, like both cross-sectional equal
protection105 and other change-inhibiting doctrines,106 should distinguish
between impairments of rights and their complete elimination. Thus, for
example, the elimination of municipal elections after a city’s voters become
predominately minority could raise serious concerns, but the assignment of a
few modest additional duties to an existing unelected city manager likely would
not.
3. Criteria from Other Change-Inhibiting Doctrines
Some of the norms common to other change-inhibiting doctrines reflect
generalized suspicion of hasty policymaking. That would argue for greater
scrutiny of policy changes generally. Sometimes, policymakers must act quickly

100. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413–14 (1915) (finding no taking in land-use
regulations that prevented use of brickyard).
101. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(prohibiting tribunals constituted outside of Article III from trying questions of state common law).
102. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
103. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (concluding that those losing welfare benefits
often will be too desperate to advocate for themselves effectively); BRUCE ACKERMAN & J AMES S.
FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 189 (2004) (describing the deleterious effects of economic dependence
on democratic participation). Of course, not all government benefits are crucial to individuals’ survival.
See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340–41 (finding terminations of disability benefits less devastating than those
of means-tested subsistence aid).
105. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 n.60 (1973) (suggesting
that a complete deprivation of education might receive more exacting scrutiny).
106. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (finding an
unconstitutional taking whenever a regulation destroys the entire value of property).
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to respond to an entirely new kind of crisis, even if they make hasty errors.
Changing existing rules can be similarly urgent but often will not be.
Others, however, reflect a far greater willingness to contemplate the
machinery of the state being hijacked for private, self-interested, or malicious
ends than cross-sectional equal protection has shown.107 In particular, changeinhibiting doctrines openly and unabashedly address majoritarian abuses
directed at people on the basis of their economic classes.108 This is true both of
substantive rules, such as the Takings and Contracts Clauses, and of the
Constitution’s structural provisions, which were deliberately designed to
prevent numeric majorities from redistributing the wealth of the more
affluent.109
Once one recognizes the possibility of one economic group harnessing the
power of the state to pursue class warfare, however, the concept of equal
protection obliges us to consider it being waged by other economic classes.110
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence emphatically rejects the notion
that policies favoring one side of a social divide may be acceptable while those
favoring the other are proscribed.111 Recent experience has shown that economic
elites can wield their dominance over mass communications to enact measures
that sharply redistribute wealth to them from impoverished people.112 James
Madison, although famously concerned that the masses would redistribute from
the wealthy,113 also warned against allowing the elite to dominate political

107. See infra Section III.B.1.
108. This unwillingness to recognize class conflicts, and to understand the Constitution as seeking
to manage them for the general good of society, is arguably an anachronism. See GANESH SITARAMAN,
THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 8–9 (2017) (arguing that the Framers
deliberately designed the Constitution to manage class conflict constructively).
109. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing the separation of powers
as frustrating populist mob sentiments).
110. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
all race-based preferences, not just those favoring whites); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (rejecting argument that historical discrimination against African Americans
justified government contract preferences favoring them).
111. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
112. For example, President Reagan in 1981–82 and Speaker Gingrich in 1995–97 paired large tax
cuts disproportionately benefiting upper-income people with severe cuts in anti-poverty programs.
David A. Super, The Cruelty of Trump’s Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/opinion/trump-poverty-policy.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ4S875D (dark archive)]. President George W. Bush similarly enacted tax cuts skewed heavily to the
affluent in 2001 and 2003 and then, when the deficit grew, sought to offset some of their costs with
cuts primarily to low-income programs in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, 120
Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2006). Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut
Con, N.Y. T IMES MAG. (Sept. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/magazine/the-tax-cutcon.html [https://perma.cc/MSW5-QPL9 (dark archive)].
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 42 (James Madison).
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debates114 and victimize less-affluent people.115 The current situation also would
not surprise Alexander Hamilton, who anticipated that some classes would have
disproportionate representation in the federal government.116
Temporal equal protection, like other stasis-reinforcing doctrines, should
recognize government as allocating the means of acquiring further wealth. This
function can be achieved in numerous ways, with the political process ordinarily
trustworthy to make, and remake, the necessary normative choices. The
allocation of productive resources, however, can ossify the social, economic, and
political order if an elite wields state power to block or destabilize potential
competitors. Here, choking off the means of political competition is one
concern, but choking off access to economic opportunity is another. Because a
key norm of temporal equal protection is to give everyone similar opportunities
to climb the ladder to success, we should be particularly sensitive to policies
that relate to social and economic mobility, even if in cross-sectional equal
protection analysis these might be dismissed as mere “economic and social
regulations.”
B.

Adequacy of Justification

Closely linked to the question of what circumstances should trigger
enhanced scrutiny is what that scrutiny should entail. Where a distinction is
temporal, the rationality of the new policy is one possible measure of
justification for a change but not the only obvious one. Courts could demand
that those defending a policy change that is subject to scrutiny demonstrate a
substantial change in conditions, knowledge, or philosophy that could rationally
motivate the policy change. Thus, for example, a public program might be
withdrawn if the government experiences a major deterioration in its fiscal
condition,117 if research or public outcry suggests that the program is not
working, or if the electorate moves broadly to a more libertarian, “small
government” philosophy.
Of course, something always has changed. As easy as it is to conjure makeweight arguments in favor of classifications, that task may be even easier in
support of policy changes. Temporal equal protection would mean little if it
had to stand aside for every random, modest increase in the costs of a

114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 29, at 267 (James Madison).
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 29, at 181 (James Madison).
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 29, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton).
117. When Tombstone, Arizona, lost over ninety percent of its population after silver prices
tumbled in the mid-1880s, it obviously could not continue to maintain the same level of public services.
See U.S. Census Bureau History: Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 2016),
https://www.census.gov/history/www/homepage_archive/2016/october_2016.html
[https://perma.cc/V6WR-XV65].
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government service, every half-baked, back-of-the-envelope study, and every
selectively applied purported philosophical conversion.
To address this vulnerability, temporal equal protection should
supplement the principle of rationality with that of generality. Claims that new
conditions drove policy changes disadvantaging vulnerable groups or important
rights will be far more credible if those same conditions simultaneously drove
other policy changes affecting members of dominant groups.118 A state’s policy
changing in response to critical reports about a program serving members of
disfavored groups would be more plausible if the state commonly commissioned
and acted upon similar studies of programs serving the dominant population
and if its criticism of the program is relatively consistent.119 And a philosophical
change that leads to withdrawals of services from affluent, powerful
communities is far more plausible than one that manifests itself only
whimsically when politically disempowered people are involved.120
This latter point is crucial. If temporal equal protection were to become
simply a new “one-way ratchet” that entrenched government interventions once
enacted, ideological conservatives would hotly oppose it. Similarly, if it
prevented the removal of unjustifiable burdens when they began to affect
members of the dominant group, the electorate would regard it as mindlessly
self-destructive. For example, the opioid epidemic, and its prevalence in white
communities, is causing reconsideration of the harsh, insensitive way we have
treated substance abusers for decades when the electorate viewed them as
primarily members of racial and ethnic minority groups.121 Particularly given
the widespread reliance on images of drug abuse to stigmatize members of those
groups,122 the impetus for this change derives at least in part from race.123
118. Thus, for example, reductions in state aid to K-12 education at a time when public schools’
white enrollment is declining might look more like a plausible response to a budget crisis, rather than
temporal discrimination, if the state cut funding for its elite public universities, with overwhelmingly
white student bodies, at the same time.
119. Recent Republican efforts to cut Medicaid for low-income people in the name of reducing
overall medical costs would be more plausible as a reaction to the program’s shortcomings if the same
legislation did not expand tax preferences for high-cost private health care plans. See, e.g., Tony Nitti,
GOP Health Care Bill Will Result in a Huge Tax Cut for the Rich, 24 Million Without Insurance, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2017/03/13/gop-health-care-bill-willresult-in-a-huge-tax-cut-for-the-rich-24-million-without-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/GXR8-C6LS].
120. Thus, expanding subsidies to agribusiness while reducing food aid to low-income people
would seem a strange way to manifest a commitment to small government and non-intervention in
markets.
121. Indeed, we have frequently seen this pattern in the regulation of psychoactive substances
when the racial composition of users changes. See German Lopez, When a Drug Epidemic’s Victims Are
White, VOX (Apr. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/4/4/15098746/opioidheroin-epidemic-race [https://perma.cc/ECF4-5EX5].
122. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 107 (2001).
123. See Mary Crossley, Opioids and Converging Interests, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 1019, 1026–29
(2019).
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Similarly, when the Great Depression brought mass unemployment to the
middle-class, social insurance programs that had been dismissed as socialist
became bulwarks of freedom.124 We finally moved against predatory lenders
when they ran out of victims in poor and minority communities and started
cheating large numbers of middle-class whites, triggering the Great
Recession.125 Yet locking in existing policies until whites have somehow suffered
comparable harms to those experienced by people of color would be to reject
the idea of democratic progress.
Temporal equal protection should allow a consistent philosophical change
toward a public health response to substance abuse; it should not, however,
allow changing these laws only when and to the extent that they affect whites.
If, for example, draconian laws still apply to drugs that have yet to penetrate
the white community, or if the federal government were to allow states waivers
of its laws and received applications only from states with many white addicts,
that would be difficult to assign to a philosophical change. Just as temporal
concerns have played a role in remedies for violations of cross-sectional equal
protection, so too cross-sectional analysis is pertinent to remedies for violations
of temporal equal protection.
Although the systematic treatment of justifications for changes is new to
equal protection doctrine, it long has been the subject of vigorous debate in
administrative law. Justice Breyer articulated a plausible standard for
justification of policy changes in his dissent in FCC v. Fox Television Stations126:
[T]he law require[s] an explanation for such a change because the earlier
policy, representing a settled course of behavior, embodies the agency’s
informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the
policies best if the settled rule is adhered to. Thus, the agency must
explain why it has come to the conclusion that it should now change
direction. Why does it now reject the considerations that led it to adopt
that initial policy? What has changed in the world that offers justification
for the change? What other good reasons are there for departing from
the earlier policy?127
Justice Breyer emphasized that he was not proposing a heightened
standard of review:
[T]he law requires application of the same standard of review to different
circumstances, namely, circumstances characterized by the fact that
change is at issue. It requires the agency to focus upon the fact of change
124. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 213–23 (1986).
125. See Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1109, 1126–28 (2017).
126. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
127. Id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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where change is relevant, just as it must focus upon any other relevant
circumstance. It requires the agency here to focus upon the reasons that
led the agency to adopt the initial policy, and to explain why it now
comes to a new judgment.128
And, of course, the legitimate justification must have been evident in the
agency’s deliberations, not the kind of post hoc rationalization by counsel
commonly offered to defeat cross-sectional equal protection claims.129
The lack of funds to continue a prior policy might suffice as a justification
if the financial shortfall is real and demonstrable. Failure to recognize such
justifications would put declining governments in fiscal straightjackets. On the
other hand, although its rate of growth has stagnated since about 2000—and,
more broadly, since the early 1970s130—the U.S. economy (and those of most of
its states) continues to grow and hence to have more resources available than it
did in prior years. Fiscal decline that is the result of conscious decisions to
reduce revenues is not the same thing as an inability to pay. Thus, for example,
a state’s failure to fund equal numbers of voting machines per voter in low- and
high-income jurisdictions when it mandates new voting technology cannot
plausibly be blamed on inadequate resources.
In addition, policy changes that exacerbate well-known problems, such as
residential segregation, 131 should be entitled to a lesser presumption of
legitimacy than novel impacts policymakers could not be expected to anticipate.
C.

State Action

An increasingly important means of disadvantaging vulnerable groups is
to withdraw state action altogether. One of the most shameful episodes in U.S.
history since the abolition of slavery—the end of Reconstruction and the
abandonment of the freed slaves—involved state inaction, not state action. To
be sure, the revanchist governments that took over after Union soldiers left
cooperated heavily with the Klan and major landowners to a degree that the
courts could certainly have found state action.132 Even without such evidence,
however, the mere act of withdrawing the state’s protective role was invidious:
128. Id.
129. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). See generally Allentown Mack Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (refusing to consider legality of new policy that NLRB did
not explicitly adopt).
130. PIKETTY, supra note 98, at 94.
131. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (finding that “anti-sprawl” rules function like exclusionary zoning).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 82 U.S. 542, 553–54 (1875) (finding no constitutional
violation when Louisiana’s government stood by as a white mob massacred over 100 African Americans
defending an elected local government); ROBERT J. K ACZOROWSKI, T HE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 142–44 (2005) (describing entanglement between the mob and purported white
officeholders).
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knowing that the socially and economically dominant group would prevail easily
if merely left alone meant that racist state officials had no need to take direct
action against the freed slaves themselves.
Similar problems abound today. Efforts to rebuild communities of color
devastated by Hurricane Katrina were clearly anemic, and many suspected that
the race of the victims was key.133 Similar concerns have been raised after recent
hurricanes.134 Except in the unlikely event of two comparable disasters occurring
simultaneously, cross-sectional analysis is useless to show discrimination. But
temporal equal protection can note that state responses were far more robust to
prior disasters that struck areas with predominately white populations.
The essence of the Black Lives Matter movement’s complaint is that the
state turns its back on acts that it would have prosecuted had whites been the
victims.135 Rarely can advocates point to contemporaneous cases with white
victims that were handled more aggressively. This severely undermines the
prospects of a cross-sectional equal protection claim even if they could obtain
standing. On the other hand, advocates might be able to show that prosecutors’
caution appears to be of relatively recent origin and that the tenor of police
training has shifted from caution to aggression.
More generally, a broad effort to privatize government functions and
services136 is occurring at the same time that much of the electorate is coming
to view those services as disproportionately benefiting low-income people,
specifically people of color.137 This withdrawal of the public role often is
difficult to justify on economic grounds138 and reduces opportunities for those
facing racial or other animus in the private sector. It also reduces the number
of actors in the social and economic sphere bound by norms of equal
treatment.139
133. See Super, New New Property, supra note 93, at 1824–25.
134. Jess Bidgood, Poor, Displaced and Anxious in North Carolina as Floods Climb After Hurricane,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/poor-displaced-and-anxious-innorth-carolina-as-floods-climb-after-hurricane.html
[https://perma.cc/WK3S-ENMW
(dark
archive)]; Rick Rojas, Politicians with Puerto Rican Roots Challenge Trump in Push for Aid, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/nyregion/politicians-with-puerto-rican-rootschallenge-trump-in-push-for-aid.html [https://perma.cc/ERX3-VAPE (dark archive)].
135. See What We Believe, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/
[https://perma.cc/TA3B-GAJJ]; see also Platform, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/8WMW-LZLU].
136. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1028 (2013).
137. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS
OF ANTI-P OVERTY POLICY 67–68 (1999).
138. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 407–08
(2008).
139. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, No. 17-1702, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 17,
2019) (declining to hold a private company contracted to provide a public service to constitutional
protections); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974) (concluding a private utility
provider was not a state actor for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
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Just as the Court scrutinizes withdrawals of aid more closely under the
Due Process Clauses than it does denials of aid,140 a temporal equal protection
claim against the reduction or elimination of a public service should be regarded
as state action even if the state had no duty to provide the service in the first
place.
D.

Entrenchment

One challenge in crafting a temporal equal protection doctrine that does
not have an obvious analogue in cross-sectional equal protection analysis is the
question of how long policies must be entrenched before giving rise to a claim.
The mere passage of a law surely is not sufficient: many laws are repealed prior
to taking effect, and others have quite tepid impacts, especially in their early
stages. More broadly, many laws fairly rapidly prove to be bad ideas. The
explosion of virtue that proponents imagined would result from Prohibition
failed to materialize; an explosion of lawlessness did.141 The Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 proved politically catastrophic and was
quickly repealed after prospective beneficiaries rebelled against the required
premiums.142 Removal of rights and entitlements, even after some people have
begun to enjoy them, is a normal part of the governing process. Popular
constitutionalists recognize that great acts do not fundamentally change the
nation until after some period of entrenchment.143 Clearly temporal equal
protection needs some similar concept of when a right or benefit has become
sufficiently imbedded in our legal culture that its elimination deserves scrutiny.
Of course, if one limits one’s attention to longstanding laws, one faces the
opposite problem: laws that have outlived their usefulness or that have been
bypassed by changes in society. We certainly cannot return to the nineteenth
century’s “vested rights” doctrine preventing the repeal of any rights-granting
statute once enacted. Whatever the needs of the fledgling aviation industry, by
the end the Civil Aeronautics Board had lost its way.144 Few mourned when the

140. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 (1999).
141. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System, in 61 UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE
ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 71–72 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008).
142. David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of
Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1178 (2010); see also Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683 (repealed 1989).
143. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 12–13 (2005); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 165 (2010).
144. Irvin Molotsky, C.A.B. Dies After 46 Years; Arlines Declared ‘On Own’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1,
1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/01/us/cab-dies-after-46-years-airlines-declared-on-own.html
[https://perma.cc/W4VE-LCXA (dark archive)].
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National School Lunch Program largely supplanted previous haphazard
commodity distribution efforts.145
Part of the answer, again paralleling other stasis-preserving doctrines, is
to seek to identify reliance interests. Some laws are designed to encourage
reliance—the Affordable Care Act’s explicit goal was to eliminate
uninsuredness among U.S. citizens—while others are clearly not designed or
funded to meet more than a fraction of the demands placed on them.146 Also,
different laws become known to and relied upon by large segments of the public
at different speeds. Conversely, as laws outlive their usefulness, fewer and fewer
may rely upon them or those reliance interests that the laws do create may be
more easily covered by replacement policies.
A related problem is how to respond to gradual erosions of rights.
Consider a police force that cuts back its patrols in a community three percent
per year after the community’s composition starts to shift away from the
dominant group. Eventually that community will be essentially unprotected,
but no single year’s reduction will be demonstrably catastrophic. Viewed over a
decade or two, this would be a clear withdrawal of police services, but in the
meantime those resources have gradually been reallocated elsewhere, perhaps
building reliance interests. Consistent with temporal equal protection’s stasisreinforcing character, a court may be disinclined to do more than enjoin the
latest reduction and any further cutbacks, leaving much of the damage in place.
This certainly is a weakness, and one that some are likely to exploit, just as
gradual accretions of regulatory burdens may destroy much of a property’s value
without triggering the Takings Clause. This possibility does not eliminate the
value of temporal equal protection: to evade scrutiny in this way, the dominant
group must repeat its slights again and again, facing political criticism each time,
and will fail if it either does too much—showing its hand—or loses its
commitment to the project along the way. In this way, temporal equal
protection complements other, structural stasis-preserving doctrines.
E.

The Paradox of Equal Protection

Many important rights contain important paradoxes. The potential
tensions between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are well-known:
as the state plays a larger role in our lives, it will have such control over spaces
that it will determine whether religious activity occurs there—with either result
at least superficially raising concerns. We have resolved that pragmatically,
145. See, e.g., JANET POPPENDIECK, FREE FOR ALL: F IXING SCHOOL FOOD IN AMERICA 48–53
(2010) (describing how that change improved the accessibility and nutritional quality of school meals).
146. For example, the Legal Services Corporation Act has never come close to guaranteeing access
to civil representation to any category of low-income people, no matter how meritorious their cases
may be. See Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen Kerr, Comment, Opening the Doors to Justice: Overcoming the
Problem of Inadequate Representation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 697, 697–98 (2004).
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understanding that devoting law enforcement resources to combatting
religiously motivated hate crimes is not the establishment of religion but rather
the defense of the secular values of safety and freedom. Similarly, if freedom of
speech extends to the point of entitling someone to shout down all opposing
voices, its communicative values would be destroyed. And if we read the Due
Process Clause as demanding such intricate procedures that no decision is ever
reached, we will not have fair resolutions of disputes over life, liberty, or
property.
Equal protection, both cross-sectional and temporal, has its own
paradoxes. Understanding the paradox of each form of equal protection sheds
light on the other.
For cross-sectional equal protection, the paradox is that perfect equality
can lock in the results of past discrimination. Thus, insisting on color-blind
college admissions policies after decades in which whites, but not African
Americans or Hispanic Americans, were educated is likely to preserve a strong
advantage for the children of better-educated white parents. Gender-blind
hiring policies may start to bring a few women into previously all-male enclaves,
but entrenched “old boys’” networks may make success much harder for those
women than it is for men hired at the same time. In essence, although it is
equality-diminishing to treat members of marginalized groups as inherently
unequal, it is also equality-diminishing to ignore the differences that result from
social and political discrimination.
Temporal equal protection analysis makes the problem clear. Judged over
an extended period, the sequence of discrimination favoring the dominant
group followed by purported legal equality still awards the vast majority of
benefits to those in the dominant group. Put another way, allowing race
preferences when they favor whites but insisting on color-blindness when
affirmative action would favor people of color is an obvious deprivation of
temporal equal protection—all the more so when the nominally color-blind
criteria tend to favor the beneficiaries of prior discrimination.
But temporal equal protection contains its own paradox, too. If we inhibit
important policy changes too aggressively, we will frustrate newly ascendant
majorities formed by historically marginalized people, alone or in coalition with
others. Here, theory developed for cross-sectional equal protection provides
insight. If one understands the purpose of equal protection to be blocking the
formation of dominant and subordinate groups,147 then one should react very
differently to policy changes instituted by those who had been systematically
excluded from power than from a relatively constant dominant group adjusting
147. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157–
59 (1976) (arguing that equal protection should be viewed as “group-disadvantaging” conduct and
“status-harm”).
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policy as conditions change to preserve its own prerogatives. Just as crosssectional equal protection can be counterproductive when it ignores real
differences imposed by social, political, or economic forces, so too temporal
equal protection could be counterproductive when it ignores real political
change.
The focus of temporal equal protection, then, should be on policy changes
in response to demographic changes or legal or political changes that make
cross-sectional discrimination infeasible. The former is widely recognized as
hypocrisy. The latter reflects a common suspicion of the good faith of parties
forced to change their ways after having been found liable for wrongdoing.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES LIMITING POLICY CHANGE
Constitutional doctrines can roughly be sorted into three groups: those
that force change, those that prevent change, and those that may be applied
either to force or to prevent change. Ours is a deeply conservative Constitution,
with many more change-inhibiting doctrines than change-promoting ones.148
Nonetheless, because the Lochner era partially discredited the use of
constitutional law to inhibit change, and because the Civil Rights Era gave
legitimacy and prestige to the application of constitutional law to force change,
the popular understanding of constitutional law tends to be the reverse.149 Thus,
in the typical equal protection case, plaintiffs challenge a longstanding policy as
discriminatory on a cross-sectional basis and, if they win, may have to litigate
how quickly the new, non-discriminatory regime must be implemented.150
But an important class of constitutional rules have nearly the opposite
structure: obstructing or striking down changes to longstanding policies more
favorable to particular communities.151 As much as change dominates the
headlines and our political discourse, our legal system broadly assumes temporal
stability in both law and social order. These rules treat continuity in legal rules
as the norm, with change an aberration requiring special adjustments. Temporal
equal protection would fit neatly into this group.
Although overriding legislative line drawing and overriding legislative
efforts to change policy are both anti-majoritarian, the latter is less disruptive
148. Relatively few constitutional doctrines are explicitly limited to forcing change. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. XXII (limiting terms of the President); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (requiring appropriations
for the army to be renewed every two years).
149. In addition, over the last century, constitutional dissonance has been as likely to come from
developments in constitutional thinking that move it out of sync with current practices as from new
practices that depart from settled constitutional rules.
150. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (requiring board
to integrate schools “promptly”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (denying Little Rock
additional time to integrate despite rampant violence).
151. Larry Alexander’s dismissal of “very limited freezing principles” is typical of legal
scholarship’s neglect of these rules’ significance. Alexander, supra note 8, at 399.
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to democratic governance for several reasons. In particular, it leaves in place
policies entirely designed by the elected branches and their appointees rather
than imposing judge-made rules. It also commonly limits only the method of
achieving the policy goal rather than disallowing effort to achieve that goal at
all.
This substantially more moderate anti-majoritarian impact of inhibiting
legislative change has allowed change-inhibiting doctrines to develop much
more fully than those, principally cross-sectional equal protection, that inhibit
line drawing. Each of these doctrines has the same function as temporal equal
protection: preventing the elected branches from changing policies.
Understanding the principles they rely upon to justify that intrusion and how
far they are prepared to go in obstructing democratic change is therefore
instructive. In assessing the potential strengths and weaknesses of recognizing
temporal equal protection, these doctrines provide far more realistic examples
than does cross-sectional equal protection, which relies on strikingly different
methods.
This part analyzes important themes in doctrines impeding potentially
oppressive legal change and seeks to apply them to understand how a robust
temporal equal protection doctrine might be designed and justified against the
kinds of criticisms that have restrained its cross-sectional counterpart. Section
III.A briefly reviews the most important stasis-reinforcing doctrines. Section
III.B seeks to extract key themes from that diverse collection.
A.

Existing Stasis-Reinforcing Doctrines

Cross-sectional equal protection requires courts to perform a highly
unusual function: prohibiting the political branches from drawing lines. To be
sure, rules of uniform treatment have long governed innkeepers and common
carriers. True also, the original Constitution had uniformity requirements for
naturalization rules, bankruptcy, and certain taxes,152 and some state
constitutions contain generality requirements153 or prohibitions on special and
local legislation.154 In general, however, courts have recognized line drawing as
a quintessential legislative and administrative function to be intruded upon only
hesitantly.155
By contrast, temporal equal protection asks courts to take on a much more
familiar role: impeding problematic legal change. When courts do so, they
generally need not substitute their own preferences for those of the political
branch but merely continue one regime that previously won political support
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4.
153. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. II, § 17.
154. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VII, cl. 9.
155. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
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rather than allow another to supersede it. A wide array of constitutional and
non-constitutional doctrines routinely assign courts that role, often with
relatively little controversy. Temporal equal protection therefore demands not
so much that courts engage in a new type of intrusion on majoritarian politics
but rather that they do what they already are doing in service of a new purpose.
Indeed, given the relatively onerous demands cross-sectional analysis places on
the courts, it is surprising that it has so thoroughly dominated equal protection
discourse.
This section surveys some of the more important doctrines inhibiting
majoritarian legal change. Section III.A.1 considers the anti-majoritarian role
of rules, most of them content-neutral, that obstruct policy change generally.
Section III.A.2 assesses rules that disallow particular methods of withdrawing
beneficial legal treatment. In some situations, barring those methods of change
effectively prevents change altogether; in others, policy change may proceed
but only in ways that avoid specific kinds of impositions on individuals. These
rules, like temporal equal protection, are indifferent to the creation of beneficial
legal rules but, once enacted, proscribe their removal by a majority at the
disproportionate expense of a minority. Section III.A.3 then notes that
constitutional law, even in doctrinal areas that nominally do not address legal
change, has in fact skewed against changes in legal rules. Section III.B then
gathers together common themes from this discussion.
1. Governmental Structure
Although the structures by which law may be changed are predominately
content-neutral, they nonetheless impede legal change. Even where a majority
of the current electorate favors change, these structures may prevent that
change from occurring. This occurs in four ways. First, some rules require
supermajorities to change but not to continue policy. They may require this of
the supermajority explicitly or may do so by testing majority support in several
different ways. A bare majority of the electorate is unlikely to measure up as
such under either of these methods. The result, in effect, is to obstruct changes
not supported by some sort of supermajority. Second, some rules require proof
of majority support at multiple times, requiring a majority to prevail in several
successive elections. Again, although a small but stable majority might be able
to achieve this, more likely this would require some sort of supermajority to
prevail in all of the necessary contests. Third, some rules require approvals for
new (but not continued) policies by entities that are not directly controlled by
majorities. And fourth, many rules reinforce the existing legal regime merely
by increasing the amount of work required to achieve change. Some of these
burdens are deliberate efforts to dampen change; others create burdens as
byproducts of other functions.
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By applying these constraints to the making of new policy but not the
continuation of old, all of these rules tend to inhibit legal change. They increase
the likelihood that people in the future will experience the same legal burdens
and benefits as those that went before them even if a majority has come to prefer
otherwise.
a.

Separation of Powers

The Framers recognized, with approval, that the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment would interfere with rapid changes in law.156
Madison conceded in Federalist No. 10 that dangerous factions may at times
command majority support but believed the federal government is designed to
prevent them from making dangerous changes in the law.157 By requiring the
assent of two bodies selected in different ways and following different processes,
he anticipated in Federalist No. 52 the failure of proposals for change that could
prevail in one approach or the other.158 In Federalist Nos. 62 and 63, he foresaw
the Senate as a guardian of the status quo.159 Similarly, Hamilton in Federalist
No. 73 embraced the presidential veto as a guard “against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority” of Congress.160 In Federalist No. 78, he
anticipated that courts would “disregard” laws that differed from the “superior”
law of the Constitution.161 More broadly, however, the Framers saw the
Constitution as entrenching the current legal regime against “the mischiefs of
. . . inconstancy and mutability in the laws”162 and the “poison[ing of] the
blessings of liberty” that “mutable policy” brings.163 Even if some good, publicserving laws were lost in the process, that is the price that we should gladly pay
to block pernicious legal change.164 Gridlock is not a bug; it is a feature.
As anticipated, our separation of powers has, indeed, strongly inhibited
legal change by entrenching current legal rules unless advocates of change can
navigate multiple institutional chokepoints or “vetogates,” each requiring them
to demonstrate majority support measured in a different, non-overlapping
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 29, at 252–54 (James Madison).
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 43–45 (James Madison). See generally THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (arguing that a national government will be less likely than individual
states to make decisions damaging to the country as a whole).
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 29, at 259 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 62, supra note 28, at 301 (James Madison).
159. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 29, at 307–08 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 28, at 302 (James Madison) (noting that the Senate’s size and tenure
make it less likely to act based on sudden passions).
160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton).
161. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 29, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton).
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 359 (Alexander Hamilton).
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 29, at 304 (James Madison).
164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 359 (Alexander Hamilton).
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way.165 The requirements of bicameralism and presentment prevent changes in
existing law unless the change is broadly acceptable or the faction promoting it
has won several successive elections.166 The nonconstitutional requirement to
obtain sixty votes in the Senate to achieve cloture on legislation, and the
increasing willingness to force the majority to find sixty votes even on routine
matters, further limits changes in policy.167 Executive orders and other
presidential policies, once issued, persist from administration to administration,
with new presidents lacking the attention and staff to review and reverse all but
a handful of their predecessors’ decisions.168 Many states have still further
change-inhibiting legislative169 and administrative170 procedures.
The counterexamples are sparse and of relatively modest importance. The
Constitution reverses this preference for the status quo in one significant
165. See Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 16–19 (1994).
166. See NELSON W. POLSBY, HOW CONGRESS EVOLVES: SOCIAL BASES OF INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 147–50 (2004).
167. That this form of countermajoritarianism has achieved quasi-constitutional status is
demonstrated by the assurances of both Democratic and Republican majority leaders that their
respective moves to eliminate the filibuster for appointments—not directly policy changes—would not
affect the sixty-vote requirement for enacting new laws. See, e.g., Kelsey Snell, Senate Rewrites Rules to
Speed Confirmations for Some Trump Nominees, NPR (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/
04/03/709489797/senate-rewrites-rules-to-speed-confirmations-for-some-trump-nominees [https://
perma.cc/6JBG-3TEL] (noting that Republicans’ 2019 removal of filibusters for appointments does
not change rules regarding legislation); see also Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option;
Eliminate
Most
Filibusters
on
Nominees,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
21,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-thatwould-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html?
noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/PS8G-6AEY (dark archive)] (noting that Democrats’ 2013 removal of
filibusters for appointments also did not affect rules regarding legislation).
168. See JOHN P. BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THEORIES AND DILEMMAS 194–95 (2016)
(suggesting that Presidents’ power to affect change decreases notably during their first term); see also
VICTORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS, SCRIPTED FOR CHANGE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 165 (2007) (noting that institutional pressures, including staff and time
constraints, typically restrict Presidents’ actions while in office).
169. About half of the states have part-time legislatures; several have legislatures that meet only
biennially. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx
[https://perma.cc/94FQ-NAZX]. Many states prohibit legislation encompassing more than one
subject, require clear statements of that subject in a bill’s title, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para. 3,
and enforce strict deadlines for bills to progress through each chamber during a legislative session, e.g.,
MD. CONST. art. III, § 27, pt. a. Some require various forms of public notice before bills may be
considered, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, pt. b, and may require delaying their effective dates, e.g., id.
art. IV, § 8, pt. c, paras. 1–2.
170. For example, some states require public hearings or the approval of a joint committee of the
legislature before agencies may promulgate rules. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4(a)(2) (2013)
(requiring public hearings if requested by any government agency or at least twenty-five individuals);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.2(e) (2017) (requiring state agencies to hold hearings on proposed rules
in response to any timely request by the public); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-110(A)(3) (2016) (mirroring
Georgia’s public hearing requirement); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4005(C) (2017) (requiring agencies to
submit biennial rules reports to a Joint Commission on Administrative Rules).
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respect: requiring biennial appropriations for the armed forces.171 Congress has
also reversed the presumption of continuation occasionally by including “sunset
dates” in legislation.172 To date, however, this is a rarity and largely applied to
appropriations acts and to statutes authorizing social programs.
In theory, Presidents are not bound by their predecessors’ decisions (or
even their own earlier choices) and can start with clean slates. In fact, they lack
the decisional or political capacity to overturn more than a small fraction of the
policies they inherit.173 Rarely has a President arrived so determined to sweep
away his predecessor’s legacy as Donald Trump, yet many of his executive
actions have been largely cosmetic,174 others have merely launched policy
development processes that likely will take years to arrive at uncertain
destinations,175 and some of those with immediate impact have been enjoined.176
Presidents also inherit a bureaucracy staffed with those hired under the preexisting policy assumptions and likely to resist changes that seem imprudent or
rushed.177 Thus, the formal and informal structures of government already
impose substantial obstacles to elected officials’ ability to implement rapid
policy changes just as acceptance of temporal equal protection would.
b.

Stare Decisis

The doctrine of stare decisis is deeply stasis-reinforcing, not just requiring
a changed majority on the Court, but also requiring that a majority believe that
the prior decision was so severely wrong that reversing it justifies enduring
criticism for departing from the judicial role.178 This presumption also likely
discourages litigants from proposing changes in law and the Court from
accepting many cases that ask it to consider doing so. More broadly, courts favor
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
172. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2027(a)(1) (Supp. V 2017) (authorizing appropriations for the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (“SNAP”), formerly food stamps, only through
September 2018).
173. See BURKE, supra note 168, at 193–94, 231–32; see also FARRAR-MYERS, supra note 168, at
165–66.
174. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 24, 2017) (encouraging agencies to
weaken health care law in anticipation of ACA repeal without making any concrete policy changes).
175. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,781, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,959 (Mar. 16, 2017) (directing the
development of proposed plans that would then go through multiple levels of review).
176. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237–39 (D. Haw.) (enjoining implementation of
executive order restricting travel by citizens of predominately Muslim countries and curtailing refugee
admissions) aff’d in part and vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741, vacated as moot and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377
(2017).
177. See Jon Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 540–
41 (2015) (describing career staff as the administrative equivalent of the judiciary, with secure tenure
and a non-partisan commitment to the rule of law).
178. Compare Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695–701 (1978) (finding limits on
§ 1983 actions so indefensible as to justify overruling seventeen-year-old precedent), with id. at 714–17
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decrying insufficient justification for disregarding stare decisis).
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granting injunctions preserving the status quo and impose heavier burdens on
those seeking to impose change through judicial orders.179
Although the Court lacks a formal mechanism for sunsetting its
precedents, it has attempted to do so in a few cases with dubious results. In civil
rights cases, it has suggested that longstanding bigotry will disappear and hence
cause its precedents allowing remedial action to expire.180 The Court’s belief
that it could limit its authorization of harsh racial discrimination to the duration
of World War II may have contributed to its infamous decisions on the
internment of Japanese Americans.181 And its embrace of an ad hoc version of
equal protection that it warned was not to be precedent contributed to the scorn
with which Bush v. Gore182 was received even among many conservatives.183
The Court can, of course, devise ways to honor precedent nominally while
taking the law in an entirely new direction.184 But the very fact of having a norm
of continuation that receives public support across the political spectrum
increases the costs to the Court of disturbing the status quo in more than modest
ways.
c.

Federalism

Although less clearly part of the original constitutional design to check
majoritarian government,185 federalism has increasingly provided another set of
checks on majoritarian rule at the federal level as public functions have become
more complex and state and local participation becomes more crucial. The
uncooperative federalism that Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have
described prevents the majorities at the federal level from effectuating broad
legal change throughout the country if those majorities cannot bring along, or
eventually wear down, state and local governments responding to different

179. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1358, 1359 (1978) (denying application
for a stay).
180. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013) (finding the Court’s decision
upholding the Voting Rights Act’s pre-clearance requirement had ceased to be effective with the
passing of several decades); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003) (insisting that
affirmative action programs’ permissibility will “sunset”); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48 (1991) (emphasizing that desegregation orders were intended to end).
181. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (upholding internment), abrogated
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 103–04 (1943)
(upholding racial curfews).
182. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
183. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 180–81, 209, 217–18 (2001).
184. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–77 (1989) (limiting § 1981 to
discrimination during the making, not the implementation, of a contract).
185. But see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (comparing and contrasting traits
of federalism and nationalism in the Constitution).
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electorates.186 To be sure, state and local governments sometimes design new
legal structures not sanctioned by their federal counterparts;187 the simplest, and
thus most common, means of dissent is to continue operating a program in the
same manner notwithstanding federal edicts that they change.
Since the New Deal, the federal government has increasingly relied on
states to administer its programs. Part of the reason is political, either to retain
policy voices for the states on matters they long had managed or to reduce the
visible footprint of federal authority. Part of the federal government’s reliance
on states, however, is fiscal: states often are willing to pay some of the costs of
programs they are allowed to administer, and in any event state and local civil
servants are far cheaper than federal ones.188 The Supreme Court has gradually
strengthened states’ hands in these arrangements, both prohibiting the federal
government from mandating their participation189 and narrowing the scope of
conditions that may be imposed on states wishing to participate.190 With
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,191 the Court gave states
sweeping new powers to block important federal initiatives.192 In effect, the
Court gave individual states a veto over changes in the Medicaid statute as
applied to them, making them another vetogate through which many of the
most important policy changes must pass.193 To win both enactment at the
federal level and implementation in the states requires substantial
supermajority support because political predispositions in the states vary so
much from one another.
d.

Administrative Law

Although administrative agencies arose in part as a means of achieving
policy change at a volume that Congress could not produce, administrative law
has developed into a powerful force for inhibiting legal change.194 Indeed, it has
186. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1265–71 (2009).
187. See id. at 1282 (discussing states’ flouting of federal drug law in legalizing marijuana). But see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (inhibiting this practice by requiring congressional approval of interstate
compacts).
188. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2567 (2005)
[hereinafter Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism].
189. See generally, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (prohibiting the federal
government from commandeering state officials).
190. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (requiring conditions to be
reasonably related to the purpose of the program).
191. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
192. Id. at 575–85, 588.
193. See id.
194. Although much of administrative law is nominally statutory rather than constitutional, as
Eskridge and Ferejohn have noted, the Administrative Procedure Act has become firmly entrenched
as a “super-statute” with quasi-constitutional status in our polity. ESKRIDGE JR. & FEREJOHN, supra
note 143, at 77.
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developed its own separation of powers, with political appointees, career civil
servants, and civil society standing in for, respectively, the President, the
judiciary, and Congress.195 This system can prevent a new majority from
enacting policy changes. By making expertise a central criterion for agencies’
decisionmaking, administrative law effectively prevents actions that do not have
both majoritarian support and some credibility in the expert community.196 And
because expertise must be proven, and may be disputed, this requirement of
administrative law increases the friction in the policymaking process, reducing
the number of changes that may be attempted as well as the number that
succeed.
The administrative process imposes a temporal constraint on
majoritarianism as well. If elections were immediate or continuous, elected
officials would be fully accountable for the actions of their appointees. But
because the appointees can operate at will for four years, either departing from
their leader’s campaign promises or disregarding changes in public mood,
administrative actions often reflect public sentiment some years before. Career
civil servants, who may have been hired decades earlier, as well as life-tenured
judges ruling on challenges to rules, represent even more of a “time capsule” of
prior political preferences. With approval from several such persons commonly
required,197 the effect is to limit policy changes to ones that have enjoyed
majority or near-majority support for an extended period.
The courts’ interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act and
related statutes also have the effect of entrenching existing policy against
majoritarian desires for change that have arisen since the policy was enacted.
Complying with the requirement of giving notice and seeking public comment
on changes slows action down, potentially past the point that the new majority
disintegrates. This is a form of supermajoritarianism, requiring majorities both
at the time of initiating the policy change and some time later at the time of
195. Jon Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2016).
196. In some environments, particularly independent agencies, majority support may not be
needed at all. Id. at 284–85. More commonly, however, majoritarian officials determine which
initiatives to advance.
197. Thus, for example, a change in regulations may require a policy analyst to write a notice of
proposed rulemaking; clearance from several layers of supervisors and the agency’s legal counsel; a
research specialist to prepare a cost-benefit analysis; sign-offs from civil rights, small business, and
compliance experts; a budget analyst assessing any fiscal impact; review by at least one division of the
Office of Management and Budget; consultation with other federal agencies; and then a repeat of the
entire process after the policy analyst reviews all comments that the public submitted. At that point,
adversely affected parties will sue in a district court they expect to be sympathetic to their concerns,
with attorneys from the agency’s general counsel’s office and the Department of Justice having to
defend the new regulation. If the plaintiffs picked their district wisely, they are likely to win, causing
additional delay while the case proceeds to a circuit court. Should the President change at any point in
this process, the entire effort may be aborted.
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completing it. Indeed, the ready availability of judicial review means that, at
least for important policies, the majority for change must be sustained for some
years after the policy is approved to defend it in court. Given the frequency
with which agencies fail to justify their actions to the standards courts impose,
some significant number of policy changes that are indisputably within the
powers of the agency will need a supportive administration several times: when
they are initially proposed and finalized, when they are challenged in court, and
when they are again proposed and finalized after having been found
procedurally inadequate.
In response to these limits and lags in agencies’ democratic responsiveness,
administrative law has increased the friction of the policy-changing process to
help constrain the vast power of the modern state. As the current President is
discovering, perhaps to his irritation, officials must go through extensive
processes of both internal and external review before changing policies. This is
just as true when moving from an unregulated condition to the imposition of
new constraints on private behavior as when eliminating such constraints—and
the expectations of those who may have relied on the regulations.198 The burden
of rulemaking also strains the resources of government to the point that a new
majority may have to prioritize among its proposed changes, leaving in place
many policies it rejects because the responsible agencies lack the staff time to
prepare the notice of proposed rulemaking (including the numerous forms of
analysis now required to be included in or with such notices199), analyze and
respond to the public comments, and prepare a final rule—or other officials in
the clearance chain lack the time to read and approve the proposed and final
rules. This effectively entrenches many medium- and lower-priority policies
that no longer enjoy majority support until their opponents have won enough
successive elections to get around to changing them.
The Court added to that burden when it required that any action to change
existing policy explain why officials are rejecting the evidence and rationales
that their predecessors had relied upon to enact that policy.200 Although the
Court has cautioned that this does not mean that officials must show superior
reasons supporting the new policy,201 new officials must still go through the
same process to change a policy that their predecessors undertook to create it.202

198. The Administrative Procedure Act ever so slightly favors deregulation in allowing rules that
lift burdens to become effective more rapidly than those imposing burdens, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012),
but otherwise imposes the same requirements for making and terminating regulations, id. § 553(d).
199. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV
1998); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Exec. Order
No. 12,857, 3 C.F.R. 623 (1994), reprinted in 2 U.S.C. § 900 (2000).
200. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–44 (1983).
201. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 513–15 (2009).
202. Id.
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Courts also favor continuity in the remedial orders they issue in
administrative law cases. Even after finding a rule or order improperly
promulgated, courts increasingly are remanding the matters to the issuing
agencies for further proceedings without vacating the problematic enactment.203
Some of this may reflect a view that defective regulation is better than none at
all, but it also recognizes the disruptions and potential unfairness of changing
legal regimes that have developed significant reliance interests.
e.

Procedural Due Process

Although formally just a constraint on how rights are withdrawn rather
than whether they are, in fact, procedural due process also makes many
substantive policy changes cost-prohibitive for the administrative state. As such,
it serves to entrench existing policies against the preferences of a changed
political majority.
Procedural due process only inhibits change, however, where the
contemplated denials would require some individualized assessments. Thus, for
example, if the state becomes convinced that many members of a particular
profession are inept and untrustworthy, it could shut that profession down
completely. If the profession and its sympathizers have sufficient influence to
make that extreme route infeasible, the state may have to allow all practitioners
to continue if it lacks the resources to build cases against individual
incompetents, conduct the requisite hearings, and defend the inevitable appeals.
By contrast, if the state wishes to reduce or abolish a particular entitlement
uniformly, minimal process is required.204 Groups with substantial political
power are likely to be able to prevent wholesale deprivations of their
entitlements, and procedural due process effectively prevents widespread
individual cullings; marginalized groups, on the other hand, derive less
protection from procedural due process because it may be possible to eliminate
their rights altogether. Much of the rhetoric surrounding both President
Reagan’s cuts to low-income programs205 and the 1996 welfare law,206 for
example, claimed that many unworthy recipients were mixed in with the “truly
needy” and that sorting out who was whom within the existing structure was
infeasible.207
203. Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for
Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 279–81 (2005).
204. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128–29 (1985); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
205. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–35, 95 Stat. 357.
206. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
193, 110 Stat. 2105.
207. Robert Pear, Reagan’s Social Impact; News Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1982),
https:/www.nytimes.com/1982/08/25/us/Reagan-s-social-impact-news-analysis.html
[https:/perma.cc/8CNV-PYBD (dark archive)].
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Judicially Designed Rules of Construction

Reaching beyond the constitutional and statutory limitations on legal
change, courts have enunciated several rules that favor continuation of the
existing order and impose heavy, supermajoritarian burdens on those seeking
change. Although courts occasionally frame these doctrines as extensions of
constitutional principles or interpretations of statutes, for the most part they
represent courts’ sense that our legal order favors continuity.
For example, courts have created a presumption against repeal of statutes
by implication;208 instead, they presume that new statutes should be read in pare
materia with older ones.209 This principle gains even more force when combined
with the often contrafactual assumption that the legislature is aware of the
current state of the law.210 When courts follow this approach, they privilege old,
sometimes obscure, statutes over the most recent expression of majority
sentiment.211 To be sure, the best practice is to do a thorough canvass of the
existing state of the law before legislating, but the pressures of time, limited
staff, and human frailty will often preclude that.212 An interpretive regime under
which some substantial fraction of duly passed statutes fails to have full effect
will require proponents of the change to achieve sufficiently supermajoritarian
support to enact it twice.
Similarly, courts construe statutes to displace the common law to the most
limited degree possible.213 Thus, legislators must draft statutes disturbing the
existing legal order more clearly than other legislation or expect it to have less
impact.214 Here again, because drafting errors and unforeseen circumstances are
practically inevitable, this means that legislatures often will have to enact two
or more statutes to impose a change in the legal order where only a single statute
might suffice, with more generous judicial construction, in addressing a new
problem.
As a group, these rules do not have a clear pro- or anti-regulatory bias: the
rule against repeals by implication tends to preserve regulation, but the rule

208. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003).
209. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (harmonizing legislation assisting
Native Americans with civil rights laws prohibiting employment discrimination).
210. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38–45 (1983) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in light of tort cases of that era), with id. at 92–93 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (finding it improbable that Congress had a clear understanding of the relevant common law
given the significant split in authority that existed).
211. To be sure, another maxim favors more recent enactments over older ones. As the Legal
Realists pointed out, many canons of statutory construction have at least partial opposites, with courts
sometimes selecting among them ad hoc.
212. Only ten states have full-time legislatures with substantial, professionally paid staffs. Fulland Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 169.
213. Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
214. Id.
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strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law does the opposite.
But both tend to increase the burdens on those that would seek to change
current law, causing some with clear majority support to fail.
g.

Exceptional Supermajoritarianism

Article V establishes a strict, highly supermajoritarian procedure for
changing some of our most important legal rules. Even where a solid majority
desires change—as, for example, was clearly the case with the Equal Rights
Amendment in the 1970s215 and may be true of term limits today216—Article V
preserves the minority’s right to preserve the existing constitutional regime.
In two important respects, Article V rejects majoritarianism altogether. It
prohibits amendments that would deny each state equal representation in the
Senate or that would curtail the slave trade prior to 1808. In both these respects,
the Framers concluded that states’ expectations of the continuation of their
current legal status—as having equal status in the new Republic and as being
able to increase their access to cheap involuntary labor to fuel their economic
growth—were too fundamental even for a supermajority to abridge.
Bruce Ackerman,217 William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn218 have made a
compelling case that the twentieth century saw a new form of constitutional
change arise outside of Article V.219 Although their formulations of this popular
constitutionalism differ, they each involve a time-consuming process in which
proponents of constitutional change must navigate the routine
supermajoritarian mechanisms several times.220 The proponents must, among
other things, win several successive national elections and so entrench their
proposed constitutional commitments that most of their opponents abandon the
fight.
Even the crass realist account of constitutional change that focuses on the
Supreme Court’s makeup requires a faction seeking change to win several
successive presidential elections and—with the Senate’s new willingness to

215. See Bridget L. Murphy, The Equal Rights Amendment Revisited, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937,
940–41 (2018).
216. See Tal Axelrod, GOP Senators Propose Congressional Term Limits, HILL (May 14, 2019),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/443746-gop-senators-propose-congressional-term-limits
[https://perma.cc/GM5S-UKTP].
217. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742–47 (2007).
218. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, supra note 143, at 25–26.
219. For an example of how these doctrines might work in real time, see David A. Super, The
Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 873, 873–79 (2014) (finding a potential constitutional moment in the ongoing struggle over health
care reform).
220. ACKERMAN, supra note 143, at 7–11; ESKRIDGE JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 143, at 25–26.
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refuse even to consider nominees of the opposing party221—to prevail in several
congressional elections at the same time. As Presidents increasingly appoint
relatively young justices, and justices refuse to step down under Presidents of
the party with which they most disagree, the number of elections that must be
won to reshape the Court has increased. Individual justices may surprise on
particular issues, but to achieve broad change in the constitutional regime, far,
far more than fleeting majority preferences are required. Some have argued that
the Supreme Court functions as a living time capsule, privileging political
attitudes from the past over those of the current political environment.222
The effect then is both to favor continuation of prior individual policies
and to entrench whole regimes because of the effort required to address each
policy even when a supermajority favors change. This means that a great many
important statutes remain in force despite being enacted by legislatures chosen
through far more limited suffrage than we now deem democratically necessary.
Even those laws that have changed often had to be negotiated with defenders
of the old order who could extract concessions out of proportion to their
numbers because of the difficulty of changing law. Thus, these stasis-reinforcing
doctrines systematically privilege the preferences of those that held power
through deprivations of basic democratic rights. Obviously wiping old laws off
the books en masse would create chaos that serves nobody’s interests, but our
system’s entrenchment of the status quo should not be understood to be either
value-neutral or even consistent with majoritarian democracy; it is serving other
purposes that are deemed more important.
2. Doctrines Limiting the Means of Changing Policy
Although most substantive constitutional principles constrain the content
of public policy, a handful specifically constrain the act of changing rules.223
They do not affect what the law and the allocation of rights may be. Instead,
they limit how the government may implement a given rule. When the methods
these principles proscribe are the only practically or politically feasible means
of changing policy, they have the effect of locking in prior policies without
regard to the current majority’s wishes.
221. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Democrats, with Garland on Mind, Mobilize for Supreme Court Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/donald-trump-supremecourt-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/W2H5-62E8 (dark archive)].
222. Thus, for example, the Court included at least one moderate Republican until 2010, decades
after the Reagan Revolution marginalized them in national and most state politics. Adam Liptak,
Conservatives in Charge, the Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-term-movedright.html [https://perma.cc/7WFA-HPVB (dark archive)].
223. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. art. 1, § 10. Of course, the procedural provisions of the
Constitution, many discussed in the previous section, also limit how changes may be selected. See, e.g.,
id. art. V.
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The Takings Clause

The Court has, for the most part, avoided declaring that the government
must establish rules recognizing any particular kind of property rights,224 but
once it does so it may not change those rules to eliminate protected property
rights. Although much of the controversy surrounding takings in recent years
has concerned the definition of a “public purpose” for which government may
invoke its eminent domain powers,225 the core of the Takings Clause is a
prohibition on forcing a minority to finance public functions. As such, it is
strongly countermajoritarian: the electorate will routinely prefer impositions on
a few wealthy individuals to paying for services with broad-based taxes. In
contrast to the Court’s reluctance to recognize poverty as a suspect classification
in its cross-sectional equal protection jurisprudence,226 the protected class here
is very much defined by its wealth. Takings law avoids the definitional problems
that the Court cited as a barrier to considering wealth in cross-sectional equal
protection: the protected class consists of those against whom the state is acting.
In addition, takings jurisprudence has escaped the principle that greater
powers encompass lesser ones. This principle has proven a formidable barrier
to asserting other constitutional protections of individual rights. When the state
would be free to impose a more drastic loss, the Court generally has had little
sympathy for those challenging lesser harms.227 Yet the Court’s exaction cases
involved permits that the state would have been free to deny outright, with the
Court nonetheless striking down the lesser burden of conditionally granting
those permits.228 In essence, the Court has found that the manner of exercising
power, as well as the sheer scope of the intervention, merits constitutional
scrutiny. Notably, takings law also embraces a temporal perspective, even
proscribing transitory uncompensated impositions on property rights.229

224. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) (declaring that
the definition of property rights for due process purposes is a matter of state law).
225. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469–75 (2005) (allowing taking of homes in
healthy neighborhood to facilitate private company’s expansion); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–
33 (1954) (allowing taking of well-maintained building in impoverished neighborhood for urban
renewal).
226. See generally, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (noting that
the Court has never recognized poverty as a classification entitled to heightened scrutiny).
227. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201–02 (1991) (upholding more stringent accounting
burdens on abortion providers because Congress was free to cut off all funding to those agencies);
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 604–05 (1987) (upholding rule denying welfare to family based on
legally unavailable child support because Congress need not have program at all); Adler v. Bd. of Educ.
of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding limits on public employees’ political expression because
the state was not obliged to continue employing those workers).
228. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374–75 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987).
229. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 304–05
(1987).
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Even after the Court came to recognize many administrative dispensations
as property for purposes of the Due Process Clauses, it has continued to refuse
to treat them as property for takings purposes.230
b.

The Contracts Clause

Similarly, while the government is free to prohibit the formation of new
contracts, it is constrained on how it may interfere with existing ones.231 Here
again, the election of a new majority that believes that certain kinds of
previously legal contracts are pernicious does not allow that majority to rid itself
of those contracts. Although the Contracts Clause also limits the state’s ability
to rewrite existing private contracts, a key aspect of it is the prohibition on the
state using sovereign powers to lighten the burden of its own contracts with
private entities. The purpose here is similar to that of the Takings Clause: to
prevent the state from shifting the burden of its activities onto a narrow set of
private parties (here, those that have contracted with the state). The Court has
broadened this protection of contractual rights to situations where the private
parties do not face any clear financial loss.232
The Contracts Clause also inhibits the state from substituting regulatory
distributions between private parties for public expenditures financed by
taxation. Here again, the concern is with making a small group of politically
weak people—those whose contractual rights are being impaired—shoulder the
burden of financing a public agenda. The Court has allowed some departures
from this principle in emergency conditions,233 but has rejected what it regarded
as efforts to exploit emergencies to shift major public burdens onto a private
minority with contractual impairments.234
Contracts concluded by one administration therefore will bind and
constrain its successor.235 They thus become an alternative form of legislation
and one that is likely harder to change.
As in the case of takings, the Contracts Clause’s protected class is an
economic one: those with sufficient wealth to have contractual rights the state
wishes to disrupt. Definitions here, too, pose little problem because the class is
defined by the actions the state takes against it.

230. Super, New New Property, supra note 93, at 1868–69.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
232. See, e.g., U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (enforcing bond covenants
prohibiting rail transit cost subsidization without evidence of financial harm to bondholders).
233. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 398–402 (1934) (permitting
temporary mortgage foreclosure moratorium at the depths of the Great Depression).
234. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 555–58 (1935) (striking down
five-year mortgage moratorium).
235. Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security
Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 895–97 (2011).
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c. Bills of Attainder, Ex Post Facto Laws, and Limits on Retroactive
Legislation
Although the constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws236 only nominally constrain the timing and generality of legislation
rather than its content, their effect is to further entrench the existing legal
regime. These rules make existing policy irrevocable as it is applied to current
events to the extent that it benefits non-governmental actors.237 Where a process
is ongoing and political or equitable considerations prevent treating later
participants differently from earlier ones, and if Congress—slowed by
bicameralism, presentment, and a crushing workload that exceeds its current
capacity—cannot legislate before the first participant acts, the legislature may
have little choice but to continue the old regime for all involved.
The Court also has applied presumptions against retroactive legislation—
as well as specific constitutional prohibitions on certain kinds of laws—to
prevent current majorities from attempting to extend their temporal reach
backwards.238
Even in the realm of civil litigation, the Court’s qualified immunity
doctrine has entrenched existing legal regimes against changes—even those the
Court itself has undertaken. Officials misusing their positions to oppress those
under their power are only civilly liable if it was objectively clear at the time
they acted that the law proscribed their actions.239 Thus, superseded or rejected
legal rules continue to operate until a new regime not only comes onto the scene
but makes itself sufficiently obvious.
The Court’s rules discouraging retroactive legislation reinforce stasis even
more strongly. Unless Congress not only sets an effective date but also specifies
that it wants its enactment to apply retroactively,240 the Court will reject
retroactive effect even at the cost of frustrating much of the congressional
purpose.241 Here again, this constraint interacts with other change-inhibiting
rules: if the administrative agency charged with implementing a statute fails to
promulgate rules on time, or does so in a manner courts find defective, the old

236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
237. By contrast, policies imposing burdens on private actors may be retroactively changed by
Congress, may be subject to presidential commutations or administrative waivers, and may be excused
by courts in equity (e.g., by finding compliance nunc pro tunc).
238. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855–56 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[R]etrospective laws are . . . generally unjust; and . . . neither accord with sound
legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact” (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1398 (2d ed. 1851))).
239. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
240. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 244–45 (1994).
241. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988).
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regime is preserved for the period affected even if all affected parties had notice
of the change and of its intended effective date.242
Notably, justification plays little role in these rules’ application. The ban
on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws is absolute, not waivable even for
strong policy purposes.243 And the requirement that Congress explicitly
provides for retroactive effect does not vary depending on the strength of the
congressional purpose or the reason action could not be taken in advance of the
preferred deadline.
d.

Reliance Interests

Although the extent to which judicial enforcement might be available is
unclear,244 deeply entrenched norms hold that the state may not disturb certain
kinds of clearly delineated reliance interests even if the current majority finds
them improvident. For example, once income has been taxed, it may not be
taxed again by the same tax system.245 This is true even if the recipient had the
opportunity to pay taxes at a dramatically reduced rate. Thus, various tax cuts
championed by President Reagan, Speaker Gingrich, and Speaker Ryan have
been designed specifically to increase revenues in early years by allowing
prepayment of taxes at bargain rates (with those revenues being used to offset
other tax cuts of a more conventional decline).246 Even the harshest critics of
these tax cuts have not seriously argued that that income could be subjected to
further taxation to reclaim the government’s revenue losses. These tax measures
thus confer the equivalent of a property status—having income that is regarded
as having been taxed—on the affluent taxpayers in question. The result is to
lock in the tax status of income beyond the effective power of future legislators
to change.
3. Facially Neutral Doctrines Entrenching Tradition
The entire enterprise of judicial review is fundamentally anti-majoritarian.
And because the Court will rarely attempt to rewrite a statute or regulation that
it finds wanting,247 the result of judicial criticism is that the elected branches
commonly must surmount the supermajoritarian requirements of their various
242. See, e.g., id. at 207.
243. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1976). But see id. at 14–20
(finding no impermissible retroactivity in statute increasing employers’ obligations to former
employees).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1994) (finding insufficient reliance
interests to disturb amendment to code).
245. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Corporate Taxation of Corporate Income,
68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 614–15 (1990).
246. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, supra note 188, at 2624–25.
247. But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 519 (2012) (prohibiting
enforcement of part of the Medicaid statute without striking down any of its specific provisions).
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vetogates multiple times to enact the substantively unobjectionable part of an
initiative. Beyond that, however, the Court has interpreted several
constitutional principles in ways that inhibit policy changes more than they
restrain entrenched policies that arguably have similar impacts. More generally,
the Court’s increasing emphasis on originalism tends to skew its interpretations
in favor of policy stasis.
a.

Stasis-Reinforcing Interpretations of Facially Neutral Rules

Although the First Amendment is facially neutral between new and old
violations of its edicts, the Court’s application of it has relied heavily upon
tradition. The Court is far more likely to find a violation of the Establishment
Clause when Congress or a state adopts a new policy favoring a particular
religion248 than when they continue existing preferences.249 Thus, the Court has
treated the status quo as creating vested rights in both champions and
opponents of state favoritism for religion.
The Court also has protected the continuation of existing means of
expression250 far more energetically than it has comparably important but new
opportunities for expression.251 And it has privileged expression through
longstanding media252 over that through new forms of communication that lack
comparable arguments from tradition.253 Although the Court has been willing
to upend longstanding restrictions on expression, it has built a regime that
strongly skews in favor of the status quo.
Similarly, although some prominent descriptions of procedural due
process speak in atemporal utilitarian terms,254 the Court often has framed the
requirements of procedural due process in terms of preserving longstanding

248. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–47 (1982) (striking down registration
requirement for religious groups soliciting donations); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963)
(disallowing discrimination against persons observing a Saturday Sabbath in a relatively new social
welfare program).
249. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668–70 (1984) (upholding nativity display because
those have long been accepted); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783–84 (1983) (upholding statepaid legislative chaplains based on their long history in this country).
250. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 501–02 (1946) (allowing literature distribution in
downtown area notwithstanding its private ownership).
251. See, e.g., Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830, 830–31 (1992) (per
curiam) (denying right to distribute information in airports).
252. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218–22 (2015) (limiting municipal
regulation of signage); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377–78 (1992) (striking down ordinance
against placing hate-inspiring objects on public or private property).
253. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726–28 (1978) (upholding prohibition of
nonobscene material over broadcast media).
254. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (establishing a three-part
balancing test).
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practices and rules.255 And even when applying its utilitarian formula, the Court
at times will disregard a balance that it finds pointing in one way to preserve
historical settlements of issues.256 Thus, new procedural rules are far more likely
to be struck down than those entrenched in the status quo.257 The same is often
true in criminal procedure. Longstanding practices are likely to be sustained,
even with paltry justification.258 New kinds of intrusions are more likely to
receive intensive analysis.259
Takings jurisprudence also is deeply stasis reinforcing. The Court has
allowed the state to regulate property aggressively, even destroying the lion’s
share of its value, if the restrictions are similar to those entrenched in
longstanding common law260 or legislation.261
b.

Originalist Constitutional and Statutory Construction

The process of considering the original public meaning of constitutional
and statutory provisions262 is deeply stasis reinforcing. It forces advocates of
change to demonstrate supermajoritarian support anew, even if the purpose or
language of the prior statute would justify adapting its application to deal with
a new problem. It also tends to privilege stasis by forcing constitutional or
statutory drafters to write with exceptional clarity, and foresight, to avoid
having their enactments read minimally. Thus, originalists commonly will seize
on one concept of a provision to discredit arguments that it served others as

255. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (describing due process as
protecting “principle[s] of justice . . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people”); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (finding that due process prohibits “change in ancient procedure”
that impairs fundamental principles).
256. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 18–19 (1981) (finding historical
reluctance to require appointive counsel where incarceration was not threatened overrode results of
balancing).
257. See, e.g., id. To be sure, in the modern administrative state, all procedures are relatively new.
258. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 318–20 (2001) (upholding arrest of
motorist for minor offense not punishable by jail time).
259. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27–28, 34–35 (2001) (finding use of thermal
imaging an unlawful search).
260. Compare, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926) (upholding
zoning that destroyed three-quarters of property’s value because zoning addresses incompatible land
uses in a manner broadly analogous to nuisance), with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419–20 (1982) (finding a taking in requirement that landlords accept cable
television boxes and wires on their property because the intrusion was similar to a common law
trespass).
261. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155–57 (1921).
262. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001) (explaining that, under originalism, constitutional and statutory provisions are
interpreted by considering both the original intent of the authors as well as the original meaning a
reasonable English speaker would have attributed at the time).
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well.263 In constitutional adjudication, this tends to confine the body of
enforceable rights to those well-established in history and presumably largely
reflected in the status quo.264 The result is to buttress even “uncommonly silly”
laws.265
B.

Unifying Themes in Stasis-Reinforcing Doctrines

Several important themes unite the stasis-reinforcing doctrines described
in the last section. These can provide important guidance about the contours of
temporal equal protection because they show what the courts already are, and
are not, prepared to do to deny current majorities the right to change current
law. These themes differ markedly from some of the long-accepted limitations
on cross-sectional equal protection’s interference with majorities’ ability to
enact classifications. Section III.B.1 identifies several norms that unite many of
these doctrines. Section III.B.2 considers the analytical methods on which
courts rely in weighing invocations of these doctrines. Finally, Section III.B.3
contrasts these doctrines theoretical justifications with those that have
dominated debates about the countermajoritarian difficulty with cross-sectional
equal protection.
1. Normative Themes
Existing doctrines that promote stasis share many of the same values. For
convenience, these may be grouped into six categories, some of which are
related: preventing state power from being used for economic exploitation,
preventing the cost of government from being shifted to a few individuals rather
than the general tax base, blocking harsh measures motivated by hatred,
preventing the government from acting hastily, preserving reliance interests in
settled social arrangements, and minimizing the costs of transitions.
a.

Preventing Oppression

A primary purpose of inhibiting policy change is to prevent the majority
from solving its perceived problems through exploitation of an overpowered
minority. This is obviously the point of the Takings and Contracts Clauses. Far
less admirably, it was also the point of the Constitution’s provisions requiring
free states’ cooperation in apprehending fugitive slaves and prohibiting
restrictions on the slave trade prior to 1808. More subtly, it also underlies
procedural due process and requirements of public notice and an opportunity
to comment prior to the issuance of most administrative rules: those wishing to
263. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 165 (2011).
264. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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wield state power to redistribute others’ wealth must first bear both the burden,
in staff time and delay, of a proceeding and risk public embarrassment if they
cannot justify their actions.266 Madison and others also believed that the
separation of powers, and the arduous process of enacting legislation, would
derail populist efforts at redistribution.267
Crucially, most of these doctrines do not depend upon showing an intent
to oppress. They exist in part because of a recognition that state machinery
often is captured for oppressive purposes, but these doctrines do not assume
that oppressive intent can be recognized in particular cases. They also do not
attempt to define which minorities are most likely to be oppressed. Instead,
they restrict the types of policy changes that seem best-suited to oppressive uses
against whomever is politically vulnerable at a given time.
Limiting important public policies to those initially in position to benefit
reduces the costs of those policies at the expense of those that could benefit
later. This allows a dominant group to redistribute wealth to its members
without concern that those policies will later redistribute away from them.
b.

Avoiding Disproportionate Burdens

Closely related, these rules seek to avoid shifting the costs of government
that benefit the public at large to a few individuals. This is certainly the core
rationale for the Takings and Contracts Clauses.268 It also means that when the
elected legislature or administration fails to finish the work of lawmaking by
the desired date, the costs of that failure may not be shifted onto those subject
to the new rules with retroactive legislation. Procedural due process, too, limits
the State’s ability to support itself through exploitative or unfounded actions
against individuals.269

266. But see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (first citing FPC v. Texaco Inc., 337
U.S. 33, 41–44 (1964); and then citing United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956))
(allowing administrative agencies to create rules foreclosing issues in hearings); Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 784–85 (1975) (allowing legislatures to conclusively presume facts and deny individuals
the chance to show otherwise in an administrative hearing context).
267. See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO 51 (James Madison) .
268. Cf. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 237, 239–40 (2003) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2001)) (emphasizing that interest on
lawyers’ trust accounts had no practical value to clients in upholding their transfer to fund legal services
for low-income people).
269. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1973) (quoting KENNETH C. D AVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.04, at 250 (1972)) (prohibiting officials responsible for
municipal budgets from imposing fines); Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1327, 1330–31 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding no substantial justification in government’s defense of system that more closely scrutinized
adjudicators with higher rates of allowing disability claims), overruled on other grounds by Mt. Graham
Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992), and Lu v. United States, 921 F.3d 850,
862 (9th Cir. 2019).

98 N.C. L. REV. 59 (2019)

114

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

The federal government’s sources of funding have changed dramatically
since its founding, but the Framers’ opposition to placing the burden of
resolving its fiscal problems on a relatively small number of people clearly
remains relevant. And this works without any substantive rules about what
constitutes sufficiently broad sharing of burdens.
Here again, applying burdensome policies only when members of
disfavored groups are subject to them makes a politically marginalized group
bear society’s general costs. Conversely, denying newly advancing groups the
benefit of positive policies artificially lowers their cost, again at the cost of a
disfavored fraction of the population rather than society as a whole.
c.

Frustrating Malicious Legal Change

These doctrines also seek to defeat malicious changes in legal rules. Bills
of attainder—legislatively declaring someone guilty of a crime based on their
previous conduct—are the most obvious example of this, but procedural due
process more generally limits officials’ ability to act vengefully against those
under their power. Administrative law’s reason-giving requirements are not
absolute protection against well-crafted pretexts, but they can trip up those
whose hatred has overpowered their capacity for reason. The Takings Clause
similarly deprives officials of the ability to ruin their enemies under the guise
of a laudable public purpose.270 The Free Exercise Clause scrutinizes new
restrictions more closely in part because of the long history of entrenched
religious groups oppressing newcomers.
Here again, these doctrines do not promise absolute immunity from
malign legislation. They do, however, reflect the Framers’ belief that the
machinery of the state is constantly at risk of being commandeered for personal
and factional agendas contrary to the public interest and oppressive to some.
Partially depleting the arsenal available to those usurpers is a valuable, if
incomplete, response. Extending equal protection scrutiny to temporal
inequalities would further that agenda.
d.

Requiring More Careful Consideration of Policy Changes

Stasis-preserving doctrines also seek to prevent hasty, ill-considered
actions. The requirement of state reasons found in procedural due process,271 in

270. But see ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK 877 (1974) (describing changes in highway routes to destroy political enemies or spare friends).
271. See, e.g., Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (first citing Vargas v. Trainor,
508 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1974); and then citing Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975))
(describing content required in notices terminating assistance to low-income families).
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notice-and-comment rulemaking,272 and in arbitrary-and-capricious review273
will be difficult for an excited mob to meet. Hasty legislators will forget to
provide the plain statement required to override the common law274 or to
include amendments to existing statutes that potentially conflict with their
bills.275 The Framers repeatedly emphasized that bicameralism—which requires
approval in a Senate with terms staggered over a six-year period—and other
explicit and implicit requirements of supermajorities empower a cautious
minority not swept up in a passing frenzy. Article V’s time-consuming process
for amending the Constitution is the ultimate example of a deliberation-forcing
rule and has indeed resulted in several proposals failing when their appeal
ebbed.
By focusing on the process of reasoned decisionmaking, rather than the
merits of the policies themselves, courts enforcing these rules can avoid
substituting their policy judgment for that of the elected branches yet still
improve the quality of decisionmaking. The great bulk of the impact here is
deterrence: awareness that courts could intervene if policymakers fail to give
adequate reasons or attempt to bypass a step in the process where reasons are
required. Even zealous advocates of change recognize the need to slow down
enough to articulate reasons. And the process of articulating reasons commonly
forces advocates to recognize that some extreme aspects of their proposals are
indefensible and must be dropped.
Applying equal protection scrutiny temporally would compel
policymakers to craft nondiscriminatory explanations for the shifts. The history
of superficially plausible excuses for cross-sectional discrimination certainly
suggests that those bent on discrimination can do so, but having to do so might
cause delays and divisions within the dominant coalition, causing some
discriminatory initiatives to fall short.
e.

Recognizing Reliance Interests

Almost all of these doctrines seek to protect settled social and economic
expectations. The Takings and Contracts Clauses ensure that those that have
ordered their affairs on the assumption that they have certain property or
272. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
273. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43
(1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (requiring
agency to explain why it is departing from its prior analysis of the scientific evidence before changing
policy).
274. See, e.g., Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 425 (N.J. 1992) (requiring statutes in derogation of
the common law to be narrowly construed), superseded by Act of May 19, 1998, ch. 21, sec. 11, § 8, 1998
N.J. Laws 144, 160–62 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:6A-8 (2013)), as recognized in
Davidson v. Slater, 914 A.2d 282, 289–91 (N.J. 2007).
275. See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (finding inconsistencies between sections
of federal elections statutes).
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contractual rights will not have their plans upended. The prohibition on some
forms of retroactive legislation and strong presumptions against others reflects
the expectation that people will learn, and order their affairs around, the law.
The prohibition on legislation or even constitutional amendments interfering
with the slave trade for two decades honored perceived reliance interests by
slaveholders who anticipated a steady stream of involuntary labor to support
their investment in farmland.
Even where the Court will not fully protect reliance interests, it often
seeks to discourage changes that are likely to disrupt those interests, such as
building one’s plans around common law rules or prior legislation. Notice-andcomment procedures, and the typically drawn-out process of legislating with
bicameralism and presentment, provide an opportunity to make policymakers
aware of reliance interests. Explicit and implicit supermajority requirements,
and procedural due process, give those with reliance interests various officials
whom they can effectively ask for relief.
The Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a broad principle of
protecting generic reliance interests created by either Congress276 or executive
officials.277 These doctrines, however, suggest that reliance interests merit
respect in many contexts, if not across the board.
Temporal equal protection can play a particularly important role in
protecting reliance interests. Many people may work hard to put themselves in
position to benefit from current policies. Families may sacrifice to buy a home
in a community with well-funded schools or encourage their children to work
for good grades required to qualify for admission to state universities.
Subsequently foreclosing the opportunities that families worked hard to access
will be deeply demoralizing.
f.

Minimizing Transition Costs

Finally, and relatedly, some of these doctrines seek to minimize the costs
of transitions from one legal regime to another. Rules prohibiting some kinds
of retroactive legislation and establishing rules of construction to discourage
others avoid the most wrenching, disruptive turnarounds. Notice-and-comment
rulemaking provides warning of changes as well as the opportunity to request
accommodations during the transition; the time required for traversing
bicameralism and presentment and to negotiate arrangements with state and
276. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (allowing Congress to revoke Social
Security eligibility after it already had been earned).
277. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426–27, 430 (1990) (rejecting
reliance claim by former federal worker misadvised about his eligibility for benefits by government
benefits specialist); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 786, 788, 790 (1981) (refusing to afford
retroactive treatment to eventual application of claimant discouraged from applying by Social Security
representative).
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local governments, as well as the advance notice rules in state constitutions, can
perform similar functions. The need to formulate reasons, and aversion to losing
an entire rulemaking if a reviewing court finds its disregard of reliance interests
arbitrary and capricious, likely pushes agencies to be less radical in the changes
they make through rulemaking.278
This fits well with the Framers’ oft-repeated belief that fluidity in the laws
was contrary to the public interest, regardless of the content of the old and new
rules.279 The legal ideology of their period offered little room for changes in
private law. It also militated against changing public law rules thought to reflect
an enduring natural order of the world. Many no doubt accepted this view
sincerely; for others, the necessity of couching changes in the common law as
interpretations of prior doctrine or corrections of discrete errors kept them
modest enough to keep transition costs moderate.
If application of temporal equal protection discourages policymakers from
making discriminatory policy changes, a side benefit will be reduced transition
costs.
2. Analytic Methods
The methods of these stasis-entrenching rules have much in common with
one another while differing notably from those on which cross-sectional equal
protection has relied. First, purpose or intent to violate these rules often is
irrelevant. The reason a bill could not achieve cloture in the Senate is
immaterial; it cannot change law. Whether states were wise to decline the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion—under which the federal
government paid all costs for three years and at least ninety percent thereafter—
does not matter.280 Agencies’ failures to provide adequate reasons often result
from inadvertence, but they still suffice to have their actions struck down.281
Second, in marked contrast to cross-sectional equal protection analysis’s
insensitivity to classifications involving wealth or income, these temporal
doctrines quite explicitly operate against economic-based harms. Takings and
Contract Clause jurisprudence in particular will entertain the notion of
economic classes capturing the machinery of government to oppress other
classes. Although the Court substantially broadened standing during the 1960s

278. See also Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695, 697, 699–701 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring advance notice to
recipients so that they may reorder their affairs before discontinuing a Medicaid service).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 162–164.
280. See
Mark
Hall,
Do
States
Regret
Expanding
Medicaid?,
BROOKINGS,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2018/03/26/do-statesregret-expanding-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/VRH8-P5JX].
281. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943) (prohibiting agencies from raising
arguments on review that they neglected to include as the original rationale for an administrative
determination).
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and 1970s,282 economic loss remains important to obtaining judicial review in
administrative law.283
Third, these doctrines, unlike cross-sectional equal protection, do not shy
away from asking the courts to engage in complex economic analysis. They can
rely on formalistic rules to simplify the questions presented, but those rules
generally do not purport to address all cases. For example, although physical
intrusions are treated as takings per se,284 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon285
requires courts to make the very kind of subjective determination—about how
much regulation is “too much”—that modern cross-sectional equal protection
doctrine is designed to preclude.286 The Court has cabined these doctrines by
applying them only to serious impositions, but that approach, too, requires
subjective judgments.287
Fourth, these doctrines are not limited to extreme situations. They do not
license judicial intervention over trifles, but neither do they require existential
threats to democracy or attacks on the most marginalized members of society.
In our legal culture, they have been integrated into our understanding of how
our government works rather than being regarded as anomalous affronts to
democratic government.
Finally, and relatedly, they involve comparing two legal regimes that both
have considerable legitimacy: one established by the current leadership and one
that either was selected by its predecessors or that has been present for an
extended time.288 By contrast, successful cross-sectional equal protection
challenges often lead to contentious questions of remedy, with the legitimacy
of any judicial resolution contested.
All of this suggests that change-inhibiting doctrines have allowed courts
to engage in far more realistic analyses of the problems presented to them than
change-forcing doctrines.289 They cast courts into roles still different from, but
282. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)) (allowing standing
based on aesthetic interests).
283. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03, 105, 109 (1998)
(rejecting standing where site of environmental harm could not be predicted); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1992) (requiring relatively certain and immediate harms for standing).
284. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
285. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
286. Id. at 413; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973) (declining
to assess the degree of deprivation suffered by lower-income school districts). But see Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (finding the same school finance system
inconsistent with the Texas Constitution).
287. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (quoting Pa. Coal Co.,
260 U.S. at 413).
288. Procedural limitations on governmental action leave in place the prior order—which may be
earlier legislation or regulations, the common law, or an unregulated environment. Enforcement of the
Takings and Contracts Clauses typically leave the prior arrangement of rights undisturbed.
289. See supra Section I.C.
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more harmonious with, officials in the other branches and hence permit a
greater degree of intervention.
3. Theoretical Justifications
The theoretical rationales for these diverse doctrines predictably vary, yet
most fall into a few classes.
Many seek to inhibit policies with concentrated costs and widely
distributed benefits.290 These sorts of policies hold the greatest risk of
oppression. Thus, the extensive procedures required to make policy give the
potential victims of oppressive policies multiple opportunities to frustrate the
benefiting majority. If the would-be oppressors try to evade scrutiny with
opaque language, they may run afoul of interpretive presumptions of
continuity. And if the oppression is too intense, the Takings, Contract, and Due
Process Clauses may derail it.
The opposite type of policy, with widely distributed costs and
concentrated benefits, raises more of a risk of corruption, which the Court
generally has said does not, by itself, warrant close constitutional scrutiny.291
Administrative law, however, and some aspects of legislative procedure, require
some delays and transparency to inhibit corrupt changes. But the Court seems
to believe that the chance the political process will resolve collective action
problems to root out corruption likely are greater than that it will overcome
both self-interest and collective action problems to alleviate profitable burdens
it has imposed on isolated members of society.292
Change-forcing doctrines in general, and cross-sectional equal protection
in particular, operate on similar bases but require much more extreme versions
to intervene. For oppression, cross-sectional equal protection requires either
severe oppression (deprivation of fundamental rights or complete irrationality)
290. See M ANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 53–54 (1965) (explaining how minorities with concentrated interests often can
overwhelm majorities with more diffuse concerns).
291. This sort of apparent corruption briefly caught the Court’s attention when it indicated in
Morey v. Doud, that a class of one presumptively violated the Equal Protection Clause. 354 U.S. 457,
464, 467–69 (1957), overruled by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). The Court soon
abandoned this constitutionalization of good government. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 306. The concept of
“givings,” and some state constitutional prohibitions on direct subsidies for businesses, e.g., UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 29, similarly seek to constitutionalize the pursuit of corruption. See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 616 (2001). Neither has proven terribly effective.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London suggested that actions with highly
concentrated costs and highly concentrated benefits—taking property from one person and giving it to
another—would be presumptively unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. 545 U.S. 469, 493
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The potential for combining corruption and oppression in such
policies could make them all the more pernicious.
292. The ordinary legislation the Court has shielded from all but the most tepid cross-sectional
equal protection scrutiny has relatively diffuse benefits and diffuse costs.
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to intervene in an individual case or a highly predictable pattern of oppression
(a discrete and insular minority) to act where less onerous burdens are imposed.
Change inhibition relies on a theory of how the political process may operate
badly; change compulsion relies on a theory of how the political process wholly
breaks down.
Temporal equal protection has much in common with other changeinhibiting doctrines but also fits well with the theoretical justifications that long
have been understood to justify cross-sectional equal protection.
CONCLUSION
Between emancipation and the 1950s, the fundamental civil rights
challenge facing this country changed only incrementally. Cross-sectional equal
protection did indispensable work in disrupting the entrenched Jim Crow
regime.
Today, the civil rights challenges are quite different. Policy change is
nearly constant. Although we still have some crude people manufacturing evermore degrading epithets—and sometimes getting away with it293—the far more
common problem is sophisticated people designing policies that harm groups
disproportionately composed of people of color—the urban, the poor, the
undocumented, people who look “suspicious” to whites—while insisting that
their intentions are pure. And attempts to roll back the gains of the “Civil
Rights Revolution” have become increasingly aggressive.
A different tool is needed to preserve these gains and to allow marginalized
communities to seize new opportunities that come to them more or less
accidentally through demographic changes. Temporal equal protection is the
natural answer to that need. As difficult as carefully designed voter suppression
efforts may be to address under cross-sectional equal protection, demonstrating
that voting rights have been narrowed is quite straightforward. Tightening
immigration laws as fewer Europeans seek to come to this country are all but
impossible to attack under current cross-sectional equal protection doctrine,294
but look quite different under temporal scrutiny. Permissive rules for siting
environmental hazards near low-income neighborhoods or on Native American
reservations that become more sensitive when affluent white communities are
imperiled may well reflect cross-sectional discrimination, but they are likely far
easier to prove in temporal terms.
In many of these cases, cross-sectional strict scrutiny’s “fatal in fact”
review is neither necessary nor appropriate. Requiring a cogent statement of
reasons that do not dissolve under intelligent examination would suffice to
293. See generally Jessica Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 507, 523 (2018).
294. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83–86 (1976) (deferring to Congress on immigration
matters notwithstanding the Court’s recognition of alienage as a suspect classification).
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expose the pernicious nature of many of these policy shifts. That is no silver
bullet, and it will do relatively little to achieve affirmative progress. But
preserving even what vulnerable people have is well worth doing.
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